Nations in the mBridge Project Are Stockpiling Gold, Driving Up Prices

 

Countries that participate in the novel cross-border payments system mBridge are each hoarding gold and are largely responsible for the bull market of the past two years.

How and when the global dollar standard will disintegrate is hard to predict, but setting up a non-dollar payments system (mBridge) and aggressively accumulating gold to replace U.S. Treasuries as the prime international reserve asset is a potent strategy to de-dollarize.

mBridge: An Instant Cross-Border Payment System

MBridge is an international payments project that was launched in 2021 by the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) Innovation Hub in Hong Kong. Currently, there are five full members—Thailand, China, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E.—and over 30 observing members. 

The project aims to create a multi-central bank digital currency platform for participating central banks and commercial banks, built on distributed ledger technology (DLT) to enable instant cross-border payments and settlement. MBridge uses an Ethereum-compatible DLT network, the mBridge Ledger, developed by China’s Digital Currency Research Institute. Because China oversees the backbone of the technology, it’s immune to Western sanctions.

A common technical infrastructure has the potential to improve the current system and allow cross-border payments to be more efficient, immediate, and cheaper. On June 5, 2024, mBridge reached the Minimum Viable Product (MVP) stage.

A Surge in Gold Hoarding by mBridge Members

Readers who are familiar with my writings understand that the gold price is determined by global flows. Based on cross-border trade statistics, it’s clear that the East assumed dominance in the gold market starting in 2022, overtaking the West.

As stated in a previous article, formal gold import and export statistics represent private flows, but they can also reflect central bank activity. Aside from elevated peaks in private demand from China and Thailand, the Chinese and Saudi central banks (PBoC and SAMA) are largely responsible for the rally that commenced in 2022, both having vigorously stepped up gold purchases after the West froze part of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves.

Strikingly, according to available trade data, the countries in the driver’s seat of the gold market are all full members of mBridge: China, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Hong Kong (see chart below). Statistics by the U.A.E. lag several years and are misleading due to smuggling to India.

Chart 1. Net gold import data through May 2024 reveals gold stockpiling amid higher prices.

Chart 2. The Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS) yield is the expected real interest rate on U.S. government bonds. Strong gold buying by the East has broken the correlation and rendered TIPS impotent.

Between China, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and Hong Kong, it’s clear their gold stance has changed since early 2022: they’ve jettisoned their sensitivity to the price. Instead of selling into rallies, they are themselves causing those rallies as a result of strong demand.

Aside from visible global gold flows, we know the official gold reserves of Thailand, the U.A.E., China, and Saudia Arabia are rising in recent years—even when excluding covert purchases by the latter two. Only Hong Kong’s monetary gold has been flat; however, it can be lumped in with Beijing since it’s a special province of China.

Chart 3. The Central Bank of Thailand has increased its reserves to 235 tonnes from 84 tonnes in 2008. In the U.A.E., official gold assets went up from zero to 75 tonnes over this time span. PBoC and SAMA gold reserves are much higher than disclosed.

mBridge Helps Facilitate a Ditching of the Dollar

The dollar is said to be the world reserve currency, which means it’s the most used currency in global trade. The lion’s share of global international reserves (owned by central banks) are held in dollar-denominated assets such as U.S. government bonds (USTs). Nations wanting to break free from the dollar need an alternative for trade and reserves.

As described above, the members of the mBridge fellowship—all running a current account surplus—have been increasing their gold reserves in recent years. This is referred to as Gold Recycling: storing trade surpluses in gold rather than USTs.

Chart 4. A visualization of the Gold Recycling trend. World official gold reserves are estimated based on reported and unreported purchases by central banks.

Getting rid of the dollar in trade is more challenging. Liquidity in local currencies can be poor; volatility can be risky with limited hedging opportunities, transactions slow and expensive, and payment infrastructures incompatible.

MBridge is about connecting central banks to provide a settlement layer for their digital currencies while supporting interoperability between participants’ existing financial infrastructures. Utilizing mBridge is a stepping stone for more use of local currencies and, eventually, an improvement of liquidity.

Courtesy of BIS Innovation Hub (2022). Saudi Arabia was the last member to join in June 2024.

Cross-border payments often rely on an inefficient network of correspondent banking. Through mBridge, though, its participants seek to do away with correspondent banking and let banks link up efficiently through the new settlement rails. According to the BIS, mBridge payments are faster, safer, cheaper, and more accessible, and settlement is final.

Courtesy of the Hong Kong Digital Currency Academy.

mBridge Facilitates New Non-Dollar Trade Deals

Energy is the lifeblood of any economy, and Saudi Arabia and China are the largest exporters and importers of oil, respectively. For a long time, the House of Saud preferred to receive dollars in return for oil, based on an agreement with the United States to invest its trade surplusses in USTs*. Despite their long-standing ties with the U.S., the Saudis are becoming eager to trade oil in other currencies.

In November 2023, the PBoC and SAMA signed a currency swap agreement worth ¥50 billion yuan ($7 billion dollars) to “expand the use of local currencies between China and Saudi Arabia and facilitate trade and investment between the two sides.”

This September, the Saudi Minister of Mineral Resources, Bandar Alkhorayef, said in an interview with SCMP that he’s open to new ideas, including the use of renminbi in crude oil settlements. No wonder the Saudis joined mBridge in June.

The PBoC also renewed a currency swap line with with the U.A.E.’s central bank (CBUAE) in November 2023 and, at the same time, solidified a digital currency cooperation agreement as part of ongoing teamwork for mBridge.

As it has reached the MVP stage, mBridge is slowly becoming fully operational. A few weeks ago, as an example, RAKBANK in the U.A.E. executed its first instant cross-border payment—digital dirham against digital yuan—using mBridge.

In May 2024, representatives of the Thai central bank and the PBoC signed a Memorandum of Understanding “on strengthening banking and financial cooperation, including the promotion of local currency usage as well as cross-border payment and settlement,” an apparent reference to mBridge.

The Combination of Gold & mBridge Could Tank the Dollar

What are the odds that the countries that have taken over the gold market in the past two years are also in a non-dollar trade alliance? Surely, these countries have a thought-out plan to de-dollarize.

Noteworthy, China, Hong Kong, and the U.A.E. have sophisticated precious metals markets where gold is traded in local currency, allowing mBridge associates to convert any surpluses from bilateral trade directly into gold while bypassing the dollar.

Saudi Arabia doesn’t have a developed gold market, but not long ago, a new refinery was opened in Riyadh under the patronage of the Saudi Minister of Mineral Resources, Bandar Alkhorayef. On the refinery’s website, it reads gold bars will “comply with globally approved standards and should be accepted globally by all customers, including all national banks.” That should tell us enough.

One requirement for mBridge to come to fruition is the completion of the digital local currencies, most of which are currently still in a pilot phase. It should be clear, though, that mBridge constituents are being finalized and coming together.

MBridge is likely to become a success because there is a political motive to escape from the clutches of the weaponized dollar if the mBridge group is able to take over the gold market, who knows what they can do on the cross-border payments front?

As we keep track of developments in cross-border payments through local currencies, the rise of gold to the detriment of the dollar in global reserves is inescapable.

Global Gold Reserves Flipping from Dollars into Gold

My personal calculations suggest gold is currently making up 19% of international reserves, up from 10% in 2014. Meanwhile, the dollar’s share has fallen from 62% in 2001 to 48% in March of this year as a result of the Gold Recycling trend (see charts 4 and 5).

Chart 5. Gold is taking over market share from the dollar in global international reserves.

Since geopolitical tensions aren’t subsiding and the mBridge group has a motive to de-dollarize, we can assume this trend will continue. And we shouldn’t rule out Western investors will join in driving up the price of gold.

The dollar won’t die overnight, yet its slow demise is worth evaluating relentlessly**. I will keep readers posted on the composition of international reserves and developments in the cross-border payments arena.

*A “petrodollar” deal in which the Saudis exclusively accept dollars for oil has never existed between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

**Not mentioned in this article is that there is also a lot of dollar debt internationally due to the Eurodollar market. 

 

 

mBridge 

Bucking Gold Repatriation Trend, Argentina Sends More Gold to London

 

In July, the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) shipped another 3 tonnes of gold to the U.K. to swap for foreign exchange. A month prior, BCRA also transported 3 tonnes to the U.K. BCRA is now estimated to have 37 tonnes (60% of Argentina’s gold reserves) on swap in the London Bullion Market.

Argentina Is Leveraging Its Physical Gold

Argentine newspaper Clarín reported in 2017 that BCRA moved 11 tonnes of its monetary gold to London, according to their research, to be swapped out for Japanese yen. “We are already doing this with all the gold we have in London, because by placing it in that financial center, we can expand its use,” the central bank told to Clarín at the time.

El País reported in July of 2024 that BCRA was again transporting gold abroad. After rumors were making rounds about how much gold was shipped out and to where, President Milei hinted that the gold was used overseas as collateral for a loan (this is how a swap typically works). Argentina appears to be in need of foreign currency to pay interest or to pay off debt.

Argentina Sends More Gold to London

A few weeks back, I was able to confirm BCRA had sent $150 million worth of gold (3 tonnes) to the U.K. in June, based on cross-border trade statistics. Because officials had confessed that part of the Argentinian monetary gold was sent abroad, and for the first time ever the U.K.—home of the largest gold market globally—recorded to have imported 3 tonnes from Argentina that month, I was confident this batch could be assigned to BCRA.

Monetary gold can cross borders outside the scope of customs statistics, which apparently happened in 2017. However, if a central bank lets a bullion bank take care of the shipping, the bullion bank has to deal with customs, and the gold will show up in trade data (as was the case with the secret purchases by Saudi Arabia’s central bank in recent years).

In the same spirit, new trade data from the UK shows another import of 3 tonnes from Argentina for July. It looks like BCRA is sending more and more gold to London in a desperate need for foreign exchange.

Most of Argentina’s Gold Is Now Held in London

Bloomberg recently wrote that, according to its sources: “before the move, about half of Argentina’s gold was in domestic vaults with the other half in London.” Bloomberg speculated there was only one shipment of gold to Europe, which would be the one in June.

So, before June, half of BCRA’s total gold reserves (62 tonnes) were in London. Adding 6 tonnes transferred in June and July means there are now 37 tonnes abroad, which equals 60% of Argentina’s monetary metal.

If Milei succeeds in getting Argentina’s finances in order, international debt can be repaid and foreign exchange obtained through trade can be used to unwind the swaps. If not, BCRA could default on its swap obligations and thereby surrender ownership of 36 tonnes of precious metal.

 

 

moneymetals 

Saudi Central Bank Caught Secretly Buying 160 Tonnes of Gold in Switzerland

 he Saudis have joined other Asian countries in ditching their long-term sensitivity to the gold price. Evidence suggests the Saudi central bank has been covertly buying 160 tonnes of gold in Switzerland since early 2022, contributing to the current gold bull market.

Although the Saudis played a key role in the birth of the global dollar standard in the early 1970s, this time around they might even become a lynchpin for its dissolution.

Introduction

Until recently, Saudi Arabia’s gold demand would decline when the gold price went up and strengthen when the price went south. This dampened volatility in the gold market, which for many decades was ruled by the West.

Ever since the West immobilized Russia’s dollar assets in February 2022, those with diplomatic disagreements with the West are increasingly exchanging their dollars for physical gold. Saudi Arabia is the latest country—after China and Thailand—of which I have found cross-border trade statistics showing it has shifted from being price sensitive to a price driver.

As the chart above reveals, when the gold price went up (2016, 2017, 2019, and 2020), the Saudis cut back imports or became net exporters. Since 2022, however, the gold price has escalated, yet Saudi Arabia continued to import gold.

During the entire rally from late 2022 until present, the Saudis have been a constant net importer which has boosted the gold price. The icing on the cake is that part of the flow into Saudi Arabia, the gold coming from Switzerland, actually goes to the Saudi central bank, aka the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA).

Exposing Saudi Central Bank’s Hidden Gold Buying

Formally, any country’s cross-border gold trade statistics refer to “non-monetary” metal, meaning privately owned. Monetary gold—owned by central banks—is exempt from being disclosed in trade numbers. As I have demonstrated in a previous article, though, the non-monetary gold crossing the Chinese border is often a shipment heading for the vaults of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) regardless.

Among industry insiders, SAMA is known for having accelerated secret gold purchases since 2022. By comparing the World Gold Council’s (WGC) estimates of total central bank buying (based on field research), to what central banks report to have bought to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we can conclude “unreported” purchases went through the roof starting in 2022. People familiar with the matter, but who prefer to stay anonymous, told me this is largely due to the PBoC, and to a lesser extent SAMA. That’s clue number one.

The gap between WGC and IMF data reflects unreported purchases.

Because gold Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) hardly exist in Saudi Arabia, we can estimate SAMA purchases by comparing net imports to local consumer demand. Not coincidentally, net imports began to consistently outpace consumer demand in the second quarter of 2022, right after the Ukraine war started. SAMA was (and is) in a hurry to get its hands on physical gold.

Discrepancies between consumer demand and net imports can also arise from dealer inventory changes and scrap supply, data that is unfortunately not publicly available.

A source once told me that central banks often buy gold in Switzerland and London and have bullion banks pack and ship the gold to wherever the central banks want. This way it shows up in cross-border trade data because the bullion banks have to deal with customs.

Switzerland Pinpointed as Ground Zero for Secret Purchases

To find out if SAMA shops for gold bars in the Swiss Alps, I have subtracted Saudi consumer demand from its net imports and compared the outcome (gold imported but not sold to consumers) to gross exports from Switzerland to Saudi Arabia. The result shows a strong match since Q2 2022, confirming SAMA has quietly been buying gold in Switzerland.

Any differences between the blue and orange bars is mainly due to scrap supply, a draw on net imports, which likely was substantial in 2020.

Saudi Arabia Owns Way More Gold Than It Wants Known

The data suggests SAMA bought approximately 160 tonnes of gold in recent years (and it was likely also buying in 2015 in Switzerland). How much it holds in total is unknown to me, partly because Saudi gold trade data only starts in 2015. What happened before that is up for grabs. Neither do I know how much additional gold SAMA might be buying elsewhere.

One thing is for certain: Saudi Arabia owns much more gold than it wants the world to believe.

The last time the Saudi central bank updated its official gold reserves was in February 2008, when it conveyed to hold 332 tonnes, which was 180 tonnes more than in January 2008. Obviously SAMA didn’t buy 180 tonnes in one month.

Past and current data indicate Saudi Arabia central bankers do not report changes to their gold holdings in a timely fashion. What will their next bulk update show?

Just like the reported gold reserves by the PBoC, the number put out by SAMA is purely political. By hiding how much precious metal the nation truly owns, the House of Saud avoids openly upsetting the United States.

But the evolution of countries in Asia storing more and more of their trade surpluses in gold—a time-tested neutral and sanction proof reserve asset—is clear. Next to 160 tonnes by SAMA, I calculate the PBoC bought 1,600 tonnes since the war in Ukraine. Both central banks, the former of the most influential country in the oil market and the latter of the second largest economy globally, must be confident in what direction the gold market is headed.

How the above ties into other concerted initiatives by Asian nations to bypass the U.S. dollar, we will discuss in the next article.

moneymetals.com

張德熙黃金前景

https://youtu.be/osJbyOHSRgk?si=2sYqR1rnkAII5VZF

 

 

 

PBoC Gold Conduit Revealed—Chinese Central Bank Did Not Stop Buying Gold in May

 Jan Nieuwenhuijs

Published: July 29, 2024

This article is an analysis of how the Chinese central bank (PBoC) buys gold in London from Western bullion banks. Because the bullion banks take care of the gold transport for the PBoC, the shipments from London to Beijing are disclosed in UK customs data. The customs data reveals that the PBoC continued to buy gold in May—when it communicated to the market it discontinued buying—at a rate of 53 tonnes. The PBoC stated it stopped buying to dampen the gold price so it could acquire more gold. 

People's Bank of China headquarters in Beijing.

Several months ago, I discovered that supply in the Chinese gold market was outstripping demand. During my investigation of this anomaly, I found circumstantial evidence that led me to conclude the surplus is imported in 400-ounce bars from the United Kingdom, and surreptitiously procured by the PBoC. 

Let’s go through some of the mechanics of the global gold market before we can stitch it all together. 

PBoC Gold Buying Hidden in Plain Sight

In global customs data—officially called International Merchandise Trade Statistics (IMTS)—all gold disclosed is “non-monetary,” meaning not owned by a monetary authority such as a central bank. In the United Nations IMTS rulebook it reads that customs data excludes monetary gold: 

Since monetary gold is treated as a financial asset rather than a good, transactions pertaining to it should be excluded from international merchandise trade statistics.

Though, someone familiar with the matter but who prefers to stay anonymous, shared with me that gold import and export data can relate to monetary gold. Commonly, central banks will buy gold from Western bullion banks that arrange transportation and insurance of the metal. The moment these banks ship the gold from the UK it is thus non-monetary bullion, but when it arrives in China it is monetized (changes ownership) and brought to vaults of the central bank, supposedly in Beijing. 

Exports from the UK are mainly from the wholesale gold market in London where virtually all bars traded weigh 400 ounces. The retail market in Britain dealing in smaller bars pales in comparison, and the refining industry in the UK is relatively small. 

In turn, at the core of the Chinese domestic gold market, which excludes Free Trade Zones (FTZs), is the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) where predominantly 1Kg gold bars are traded. 

Chart 1. In the entire history of the SGE large 400-ounce bars have hardly ever traded. The most traded product on the SGE is the 1Kg 99.99 fine physical contract. 

The private sector in China trades 1Kg bars through SGE, while the central bank buys “large bars” (400-ounce bars) abroad. As all gold on the SGE is traded in yuan, the PBoC can only diversify its international reserves by buying gold overseas with dollars or other foreign exchange. Aside from logic, there are multiple sources that have made clear the PBoC doesn’t purchase gold on the SGE. For example, the World Gold Council (WGC, page 9), the SGE (page 4), and it was confirmed to me personally by an ex-gold trader from a Chinese state-owned bank. 

The SGE captures the lion share of all gold trading in the Chinese private market. There are rules and incentives that steer most supply—imports, domestic mine production, and recycled metal—towards the SGE, which for liquidity reasons attracts most demand. Hence, the gold withdrawn from the SGE vaults is often used as a proxy for Chinese wholesale demand. In a formula: 

SGE withdrawals = net import + domestic mine output + recycled metal 

Chart 2. Apparent Chinese gold supply and demand. 

Before 2022, gold supply and demand in the Chinese market matched. SGE withdrawals were always higher, to varying degrees, than net import plus domestic mine output, the difference being gold recycled through the central bourse. 

If it were true that bullion banks ship gold to China, as non-monetary gold visible in customs data, that doesn’t flow into the SGE system, we would see a discrepancy between apparent Chinese gold supply and SGE withdrawals. As more gold would be supplied to China than sold through the SGE. In a formula:

SGE withdrawals < net import + domestic mine output + recycled metal

Chart 3. Starting in 2022 there has been an increase in months wherein net imports alone are higher than SGE withdrawals.

Indeed, both in 2022 and 2023 China’s net import plus mine output transcended SGE withdrawals (let alone if we would add recycled gold). 

Chart 4. In 2022 and 2023 apparent supply was higher than demand (SGE withdrawals). 

As we shall see, the surplus in the Chinese gold market—imports that are not sold through the SGE—is being absorbed by the PBoC. 

Readers with deep knowledge of the Chinese gold market might think: “what if the large bars are refined in FTZs and loaded into SGE vaults without being withdrawn?” I checked with a source that has connections to refineries in China, and according to this person the refineries don’t use any large bars as feedstock for producing 1kg bars for the SGE*. Another contact I have, close to the SGE, shared with me that SGE inventory in April 2024 accounted for about 300 tonnes. Inventory had gone up recently together with a rise in the price of gold, this person said. However, the increase in SGE inventory can’t make up for the surplus in the market, which is at least 400 tonnes according to my calculations. 

More Data Supporting the Thesis 

By comparing estimated central bank purchases by the WGC, based on field research, to official statistics regarding gold buying by central banks, we know that since the start of the Ukraine war, in February 2022, monetary authorities in aggregate are secretly buying much more than they report. I have written before that these covert purchases can be attributed for roughly eighty percent to the PBoC. 

Chart 5. Total estimated central bank gold buying by the WGC, versus official statistics by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The difference reflects covert acquisitions. 

“Unreported” PBoC gold purchases exploded when $300 billion in foreign exchange reserves from the Russian central bank were frozen by the West early 2022 due to the war. Notably, the UK began exporting 400-ounce bars to China in huge tonnages at the same time. Coincidence? I think not. Ever since, China has taken over gold price control from the West and broke the gold price’s correlation with “real rates” (10-year TIPS yield). 

Chart 6. The UK’s direct export to China is likely destined for the PBoC.

Chart 7. The US dollar gold price versus the 10-year TIPS yield (real rates). Early 2022 the correlation broke because of, inter alia, massive PBoC purchases. 

The final clue is that there is a relationship between what the Chinese central bank officially reports to be accumulating, and gold exports from the UK to China. What frequently happens, exposed by comparing these numbers, is that the PBoC starts buying gold a few months before it tells the world about it, and severely underreports its additions. This was the case in 2015, 2019, and 2022. 

Chart 8. Official data on PBoC gold buying versus UK gold exports to China. Previous exports from the UK for the PBoC were not large enough to create an apparent surplus in the Chinese gold market. 

Conclusion

It all fits and makes sense: the motive, the data, and the anecdotal evidence. Let’s summarize our key findings: 

The Chinese central bank desperately needs to diversify its foreign exchange reserves since the beginning of 2022. Since then, the PBoC secretly buys large amounts of gold.

At the same time, export of large gold bars from the UK to China explodes. 

A “surplus” in the Chinese market appears, while the bullion is not to be found in SGE vaults. As if it has gone up in smoke. 

A source indicates that gold shipments for central banks are often included in customs data. 

There is a correlation between PBoC official buying and UK exports to China, suggesting the Chinese central bank buys gold in England’s capital and lets banks supervise transport (maybe because the PBoC reaches the limits of its own capacity to ship gold when volumes are sizable). 

It all points towards UK gold exports to China are destined for the PBoC—although probably not every ounce of these flows is for the Chinese central bank. Clearly, the PBoC is accumulating more gold than it wants to disclose. 

When the PBoC stated it had stopped buying gold in May 2024, after continuous purchases for 18 months, I didn’t believe it. The PBoC has few reasons to cease growing its gold reserves in the current geo-political and monetary landscape with a plethora of challenges. 

Click on the image to view the tweet on X.

Probably, the PBoC wants the most gold for its dollars, so when the price rises fast it will signal it stopped buying, trying to cool the market. In the meantime, the United Kingdom exported 53 tonnes to China in May, of which likely most found its way to Beijing. 

Note, the PBoC also buys in Switzerland and other countries, flows that can be included or excluded in customs reports, but it’s impossible, from where I stand now, to measure all these separately. 

Finally, some of my previous analyses have been skewed by the above. Private demand in China has been lower because some (“non-monetary”) imports were taken by the central bank. 

Notes

*This person’s intelligence doesn’t mean refineries in Chinese FTZs can’t be refining any 400-ounce bars into smaller ingots. It probably happens, but not on a grand scale.

World’s lowest cost gold producers in Q3 2023 - report

 https://www.kitco.com/news/article/2023-12-22/worlds-lowest-cost-gold-producers-q3-2023-report

Kitco News) – Centerra Gold was the lowest cost gold producer in Q3 2023 (among 100koz+/quarter producers) measured by all-in sustaining cost metric, followed by Lundin Gold and Perseus Mining. The average AISC reported by lowest cost producers increased by 3% y-o-y, largely due to inflationary pressures.

The following is the list of the top 10 lowest cost gold mining companies in Q3 2023. We looked only at companies that produced more than 100,000 ounces of gold in Q3 2023 and reported all-in sustaining cost (AISC) metric, which serves as an internationally recognized benchmark for operating efficiency. AISC is in USD.

1. Centerra Gold (TSX:CG) (NYSE:CGAU). $827/oz. The company’s AISC on a by-product basis was $827 per ounce in Q3 2023, down 12% compared to $941 per ounce in Q3 2022. According to Centerra, the decrease in AISC on a by-product basis was primarily due to lower gold production costs per ounce and lower corporate general administrative costs. This was partially offset by lower by-product credits as a result of lower copper pounds sold and higher sustaining capital expenditures at the Mount Milligan mine and the Öksüt mine.

2. Lundin Gold (TSX:LUG) (OTCQX:LUGDF). $907/oz. Ecuador-focused gold producer Lundin Gold reported AISC of $907 per oz of gold sold in Q3 2023, up 12% compared to Q3 2022, primarily because of lower gold production due to expected lower grade and recoveries, as well as an increase in sustaining capital activities during the quarter.

3. Perseus Mining (ASX:PRU) (TSX:PRU). $937/oz. Africa-focused gold producer Perseus Mining reported AISC of $937/oz in Q3 2023, which is an increase of 7% from Q3 2022 ($879/oz).

4. Endeavour Mining (LSE:EDV) (TSX:EDV) (OTCQX:EDVMF). $967/oz. Endeavour Mining, the largest gold producer in West Africa, reported AISC from continuing operations of $967/oz in Q3 2023, an increase of 13% over Q3 2022, due to higher costs across all the company’s continuing operations.

5. Evolution Mining (ASX:EVN). $1,056/oz. Australia’s Evolution Mining reported AISC of $1,056/oz in Q3 2023, up 2% compared to AISC of $1,034/oz in Q3 2022.

6. Alamos Gold (TSX:AGI) (NYSE:AGI). $1,121/oz. The company’s Q3 2023 AISC of $1,121 per ounce was 5% lower than the prior year period driven by the low-cost production growth from La Yaqui Grande.

7. Agnico Eagle (NYSE:AEM) (TSX:AEM). $1,210/oz. The company’s AISC increased by 9% when compared to the prior-year period primarily due to higher minesite costs per tonne resulting from inflation.

8. Barrick (NYSE:GOLD) (TSX:ABX). $1,255/oz. Barrick’s AISC was 1% lower than the prior year quarter, mainly due to the impact of the sales mix across the portfolio, with a higher contribution of ounces at a lower cost per ounce from Cortez, Turquoise Ridge and Kibali, combined with lower unit costs at Carlin and lower minesite sustaining capital expenditures on a per ounce basis.

9. Eldorado Gold (TSX:ELD) (NYSE:EGO). $1,259/oz. Eldorado Gold’s AISC increased by 11% y-o-y to $1,259/oz in Q3 2023, primarily due to lower production at Kisladag and price increases for certain commodities and consumables.

10. Kinross (TSX: K) (NYSE: KGC). $1,264/oz. In Q3 2023, the company’s AISC from continuing operations per Au oz. sold on a by-product basis was $1,264, compared with $1,269 in Q3 2022. Kinross noted the ramp-up of production at La Coipa, which continued to be the company’s lowest cost operation in Q3 2023.

Lowest cost gold producers in Q3 2023

數字人民幣

 https://youtu.be/gjawsTlpLPw