2013年8月31日星期六

溫州大款落難13億剩30蚊


【on.cc 東方互動 專訊】 相信大家對「溫州炒樓團」印象仍好深刻,事關班溫州人個個都好豪氣,更話「溫州人買樓如買白菜」呀!不過,事隔幾年,令到他們賺大錢的民間高利貸已經爆煲,搞到當地經濟變差,更有好多企業老闆還不到錢。

據說近日浙江有位企業老闆炒樓欠下巨債。原來他早在五月已經被公安拉了,更被起訴「涉嫌非法吸收公共存款」,金額足足有13億元(人民幣‧下同)。但最諷刺的是,公安拉他時,他身上只剩下30蚊!絲絲收到風,他同其他溫州老闆一樣,都是靠借民間「大耳窿」來炒樓,由於早幾年炒樓手風都幾順,結果愈炒愈大!不過,最近一年因為溫州的資金鏈斷裂,搞到他「周身蟻」,所以累計高達13億元的債務!

絲絲聽講,13億元債務入面,有6.3億是來自民間的高息借貸,而且有成73人借了錢給他呀!不過弊就弊在,這73個借「大耳窿」給他的人,可能都是問人借「大耳窿」的,涉及的人多到數不完呀!絲絲希望溫州人可以吸取教訓,不要再「放貴利」啦,事關用錢搵錢雖然利潤高,但真是好危險!

Your Personal Gold Standard

People are going to have to pay attention to that. And either the Chinese are dopes, which they’re not, or people will start to get gold, which they will.

But if there’s a run on paper currencies (which is entirely possible) and there’s borderline hyperinflation (which is entirely possible), they may have to go to a gold standard… Not because they want to, but because they find it necessary to calm the markets.



By James Rickards, The Daily Reckoning Jul 12, 2013, 9:22 AM  


There isn’t a central bank in the world that wants to go back to a gold standard. But that’s not the point. The point is whether they will have to.

I’ve had conversations with several of the Federal Reserve Bank presidents. When you ask them point-blank, “Is there a theoretical limit to the Fed’s balance sheet?” they say no. They say there are policy reasons to make it higher or lower, but that there’s no limit to the amount of money you can print.

That is completely wrong. That’s what they say; that’s how they think; and that’s how they act. But in their heart of hearts, some people at the Fed know it’s wrong. Luckily, people can vote with their feet.

I always tell people who say we’re not on the gold standard that, in a way, we are. You can put yourself on a personal gold standard just by buying gold. In other words, if you think that the value of paper money will be in some jeopardy, or confidence in paper money may be lost, one way to protect yourself is by buying gold, and there’s nothing stopping you.

The typical rejoinder is, “What’s the point of owning gold? They’re just going to confiscate it, like Roosevelt did in 1933?”

I find that extremely unlikely.

In 1933, we’d just come through four years of the Great Depression, and Roosevelt was new in office. People talk about the first hundred days, but he closed the banks right after he was sworn in. And he confiscated gold only a few weeks later.

And it wasn’t as if Elliot Ness was going door to door, breaking into your house and taking gold. They wanted to get a small number of people who had 400-ounce bars in bank vaults. And they got those people because they were able to close the banks and use them as intermediaries to confiscate that gold. But now, it’s far more dispersed, and there’s far less trust in government.

If the government tried to confiscate gold today, there would be various forms of resistance. The government knows this. So they wouldn’t issue that order, because they know it couldn’t be enforced, and it might cause various kinds of civil disobedience or pushback, etc.

As long as you can own gold, you can put yourself on your own gold standard by converting paper money to gold. I recommend you do that to some extent. Not all in, but I recommend having 10% of your investable assets in gold for the conservative investor, and maybe 20% for the aggressive investor — no more than that.

Those are pretty high allocations relative to what people have. Most people own no gold, and all the institutions combined have an allocation to gold of about 1.5%. So even if you take the low end of this range, you’re still nowhere near 10%. In fact, institutions could not double their gold allocation even to 3%. There’s not enough gold in the world — at current prices — to satisfy that demand. So it’s got this huge upside associated with it.

Still, central banks don’t want to go to a gold standard. But if gold is a barbarous relic, if gold has no role in the monetary system, if gold is a “stupid” investment, then why do the Chinese have 5,000 tonnes? Are they stupid?

If some scenarios play out, you are going to see the price of gold go up… a lot. And it may go up a lot in a very short period of time. It’s not going to go up 10% per year for seven years and the price doubles. It’s going to chug along sideways, maybe in an upward trend, with a lot of volatility. It will have a kind of a slow grind upward… and then a spike… and then another spike… and then asuper-spike. The whole thing could happen in a matter of 90 days — six months at the most.

When that happens, you’re going to have two Americas. You’re going to have an America that was not prepared. Paper savings will be wiped out; 401(k)s will be devalued; pensions, insurance and annuities will be devalued through inflation… Because remember, it’s not just the price of gold going up.

It’s like putting a thermometer in a patient, getting a 104-degree temperature and blaming the thermometer. The thermometer’s not to blame; it’s just telling you what’s going on. Likewise, the price of gold is not an economic object or aim in itself; it’s a price signal. It tells you what’s going on in the economy. And gold at the levels I’m talking about would mean that you’ve now verged into hyperinflation, or something close to it, because nothing happens in isolation.

At that point, you have to give more credence to gold. Now you’ve crossed the threshold. The minute you think of gold and paper money side by side, or having some relationship, you get to these price levels of $7,000-8,000 an ounce. They’re not made up. They’re not there to be provocative. They’re actually the math. Those are the numbers you get when you simply divide the money supply by the amount of gold in the market.

Your Personal Gold Standard

People are going to have to pay attention to that. And either the Chinese are dopes — which they’re not — or people will start to get gold, which they will.

But if there’s a run on paper currencies (which is entirely possible) and there’s borderline hyperinflation (which is entirely possible), they may have to go to a gold standard… Not because theywant to, but because they find it necessary to calm the markets.

I suggest you buy your gold at current levels — $1,200, $1,250 — and ride the wave up to these much higher levels ($4,000-5,000 an ounce) and then assess the situation. Be nimble. You can’t just write a game plan today and follow it step by step. That’s nonsense. You have to be nimble; you have to be following developments; you have to be prepared to change your mind based on new news.

分析:國際金融體系亟待改革



世界注定要陷入泡沫、金融危機、貨幣崩潰的無盡循環中。要適應這種循環。至少這是上週在美國懷俄明州傑克遜霍爾(Jackson Hole)舉行的央行行長年會上,世界各國央行行長們的預期。這次會議由美國堪薩斯城聯邦儲備銀行(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City)組織,行長們在自身權威搖搖欲墜的尷尬中仍然撥冗出席。

他們對國際金融體系的所有探討都帶有一種接受現狀的宿命論色彩。儘管非傳統貨幣政策獲得成功,最近金融監管也有了較大的升級,我們依然無法解決全球經濟中的不平衡問題,這意味著未來將出現新危機。

實際上,問題正在惡化。自從1971年舊的布雷頓森林(Bretton Woods)固定匯率體系崩潰以來,世界已經習慣於國際金融的“三難困境”:自由資本流動、固定匯率以及獨立貨幣政策三者不可能同時實現。大多數國家選擇掌控本國貨幣政策以及實行浮動匯率制。

然而,倫敦商學院(London Business School)的埃萊娜•雷伊(Hélène Rey)教授在傑克遜霍爾發布了一篇優秀的新論文,文中指出,在美聯儲(Fed)貨幣政策驅動下的全球信貸和資本流動循環意味著,即使是浮動匯率也不能確保一個國家主導自身的命運。 “三難困境”實際上是兩難困境。於是選擇變成了:要么實施資本控制,要么讓美聯儲來左右本國經濟。

傑克遜霍爾會議上人們對這一悲觀分析的無奈接受令人震驚,特別是,由於美聯儲醞釀縮減每月850億美元的資產購買,資本正紛紛逃離新興世界,並拉低了匯率。這至少會給發展中國家帶來通脹和利率升高的風險;那些曾經過度享受資本流入的國家,比如印度和印度尼西亞,則可能會遭受更大的衝擊。

然而,所有的討論都是關於單個國家如何規避資本流入和流出的影響。雷伊得出的結論就是,不能指望美聯儲在製定政策的時候考慮別的國家(這也是不合法律的)。她建議採取有針對性的資本控制、嚴格的銀行監管和國內政策來給信貸繁榮降溫。

實際上,這樣做肯定不會有好效果。這種做法要求世界上每個國家嚴格自律,以應對不斷變化的全球資本流動。這就好像是說,如果世界上每個人每個小時都洗手,並且從來不出門,就能治愈感冒了。即使這樣做有效,政策的必要波動也依然會給這樣做的國家帶來沉重的經濟成本。

但這也不是唯一的選擇。五年前雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破產之後,人們一度期望形成一種新的國際金融體系。這種期望已經消失,但我們迫切需要找回它。

國際金融體系的缺陷是由來已久而且根深蒂固的,改革它們的努力也都以失​​敗而告終。其中一個主要缺陷是,缺乏一種機制,迫使經常項目盈餘國家減少盈餘。由此可能形成嚴重的不平衡並且會一直持續,比如中國的盈餘就使得大量資本流入美國,助長了金融危機。

實際上,擁有盈餘是明智的,因為如果投資者決定將資金撤出你的國家,沒有哪個國際央行可以依靠。誠然,有一個叫做國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的機構,但1997年亞洲國家嘗試過向其求助,這次經歷是如此“愉快”,以至於從那之後它們就一直在積累外匯儲備以避免這樣的情況重演。

如果國際金融體係依靠一個國家的貨幣(美元)作為其儲備資產,那麼就不可能形成可靠的支撐。因為只有美聯儲能印美元。危機之中,美元是絕對不夠的,隨著世界經濟相對於美國的增長,這種短缺只會加劇,即使目前新興市場的問題是美元持有量過多。

解決之道就是約翰•梅納德•凱恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)於上世紀三十年代提出的:創建一種國際儲備資產,制定各國貨幣與之兌換的規則,懲罰那些永久持有盈餘的國家。金融危機之後,聯合國(UN)、經濟學家約瑟夫•斯蒂格利茨(Joseph Stiglitz)、乃至中國央行行長都提出了大量類似的提議,卻都不了了之。

甚至是朝向這個目標邁出的最基本的第一步——增加IMF的資源,賦予新興市場更多的投票權,這樣在需要的時候IMF就可以成為它們的支撐——在美國國會就遭到堵截。

然而,目前實施改革的可能是幾十年來最大的。危機和衰退緩解了全球不平衡,即使只是暫時的。因此,以中國為代表的國家也就不再需要立刻做出較大調整來減少其盈餘。

金融危機也讓美國深刻意識到為世界提供儲備貨幣的壞處。

新興市場也得到一記警鐘,看到輸入美國貨幣政策的危害。

漸進改變比突然變革更加可行,但現在已經是起步改革的時候了。自從金本位制結束之後,穩定的國際金融體係就不復存在。然而,創造這種穩定體系的第一個條件就是有膽量去嘗試。


譯者/王慧玲

印度總理辛格 安撫外國投資者 排除資本管制 稱改革將幫助盧比反彈





印度總理辛格週五承諾將採取“所有可能的措施”削減經常賬戶赤字,並表示不會限制資本流出。這是印度匯率危機以來,辛格做出的最強有力的干預,希望能安撫外國投資者。他堅持說,目前的危機不會重複1991年那樣的國際收支危機。

辛格為經濟政策辯護,稱過去一年的改革將幫助抑制盧比下跌,並振興經濟增長。他呼籲把焦點重新轉向結構改革,以支持步履蹣跚的印度經濟。

印度第二季度GDP增速放緩至2009年以來最低水平,這加劇了該國的政策兩難。據華爾街見聞,當天的數據顯示,印度第二季度GDP同比僅增長4.4%,不及預期的增長4.7%;第一季度增長為4.8%。

辛格當天在議會講話時,指責外匯投資者造成了近期印度盧比的大幅下跌。不過他也承認,印度國內缺乏行動也導致危機加劇,導致金融市場動盪,並破壞了投資者對印度增長前景的信心。

辛格說:

    “外匯市場有臭名昭著的歷史,它總是會過度反應。很不幸,這些正在發生。”

    “因為我們的經常賬戶赤字大,以及其他一些國內因素,盧比遭到了特別的衝擊...因為我們進口的大量黃金,而且原油進口和煤的成本上升,局勢出現了大幅惡化。”

為了安撫外國投資者,辛格再次承諾,不會引入資本管制,並稱印度政府將尋求吸引新的資金流。印度計劃在本財年將經常賬戶赤字削減至700億美元,吸引新資本將是其中的措施之一。

辛格說,他會做一切必要的措施,包括削減在政治上敏感的補貼項目,以將財政赤字削減至GDP的4.8%。他還會尋求讓印度反對黨支持進一步改革。

他說,

“過去簡單的改革已經做了,我們接下來將有更困難的改革。”

辛格希望能獲得支持推進一些立法,包括對外國公司開放保險行業,引入稅收改革等。反對黨領袖快速拒絕了這些建議,稱辛格一直在重複改革,但很多最終都沒有兌現。