2013年12月17日星期二

Shanghai Gold Exchange Physical Delivery Equals Chinese Demand

Submitted by Koos Jansen, In Gold We Trust:
In this post I will further analyze the structure of the Chinese gold market, display new findings on how we can measure Chinese gold demand by the amount of gold withdrawn from the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) vaults, discuss the consequences from these findings and touch upon a few other aspects of Chinese demand. Because of my belief that this is highly important information, I will try to be painstakingly accurate in this post and support my analysis by appending various sources.

SGE physical delivery year to date is 2023 tons, second number from the right (累计交割量) is gold withdrawn YTD in Kg, and will be 2146 tons by year end. Total demand including PBOC purchases will be over 2500 tons en net import 2000 tons.

SGE delivery week 47

The key institutions of the Chinese gold market are the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE), the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE), the People’s Bank Of China (PBOC) and the China Gold Association (CGA). A good part of my information is based on three types of reports published by these institutions: the CGA Gold Yearbooks, the SGE Annual Reports and the China Gold Market Reports. I will refer to them as the gold reports or just the reportsSome editions are publicly available on the SGE website, some were sent to me by contacts in the mainland. Although most of these reports are compiled through a collaboration of the four institutions, in this post the PBOC will be referred to as the writer.

When I speak of total Chinese demand in this post, I mean total demand as described by the China Gold Market Reports, written by the PBOC. This includes jewelry, coin, bar and all sorts of industrial demand, it excludes PBOC purchases. Thomson Reuters GFMS and the World Gold Council use different measures of demand as I will discuss later. When I speak of SGE delivery I refer to the amount of gold withdrawn from the SGE vaults. 

The Structure Of The Chinese Gold Market
Let’s start with a few basics about the Chinese gold market. Like the title of this posts suggests and like I have exposed in part one, we can measure Chinese demand by how much gold is withdrawn from the SGE vaults. This is possible because of how the Chinese gold market is designed by the PBOC. In China all fresh gold (my term for mine and import supply) is required to be sold through the SGE, and once bars are withdrawn from the SGE vaults they are not allowed to be re-deposited. These facts are essential for our understanding of this market. Let me explain further:

China Mainland Gold Imports

Although the rules might change sometime soon – the PBOC recently published a draft of new import rules – at this moment there are nine commercial banks that are allowed to import and export gold, and engage in gold consignment.

icbc 2
1. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
2. Shenzhen Development Bank
3. Agricultural Bank of China
4. China Construction Bank
5. China Minsheng Bank
6. Bank of Shanghai
7. Industrial Bank
8. Bank of China
9. Ping An Bank

There are also 6 other companies that are allowed to import and export gold products like jewelry. Individuals are officially allowed to import and export 50 grams of bullion, though customs is less stringent on the import side.
This is how Consignment works, from the China Gold Market Report 2009:
Gold consignment business
China imposes stringent controls over import and export of gold raw materials; only the big four state owned commercial banks are allowed to engage in the agency business of gold import and export, and “gold consignment” is the main means for import. Under the gold consignment scheme, a foreign commercial bank consigns its gold to the coffers of a Chinese commercial bank which determines the price of the gold consigned and sells it through SGE in accordance with China’s gold regulatory policy, international gold prices, exchange rates and other factors.

Consignment licenses were first to handed out by the PBOC in 2003 to four banks, as part of China’s three transformation gold market strategy. Five other banks were handed licenses in 2010. I came across a very informative article on sina.com from the same year:
“我们也是刚获得进口黄金资质,一切都在学习中。”一股份制银行黄金业务人士表示,“听同行介绍,每一笔进口业务都要向央行报告;我们进口黄金都是标准金,也要先进入上海黄金交易所交易,即便是自用,也需要先进入交易所市场。”
“We too just got the qualification to import gold, everything is being studied now.” A banker responsible for gold business at a banking corporation said, “according to the introduction by fellow bankers in the same business. Every import deal must be reported to the central bank. The gold we import is standard gold, which must be traded on the SGE first. Even if it’s for self-use, the gold must go through the SGE market first.

There we can read the rule on gold import being required to be sold through the SGE first. The same rule was reported by Bloomberg this year:
Commercial banks that are qualified to import gold are required to sell their shipments into the bourse [SGE].

Chinese Gold Mining

Although I also touched upon this in part one, here’s the mining rule once again:
On October 30, 2002, the Shanghai Gold Exchange commenced operation under the supervision of the State Council. Thereafter, the PBOC ceased its gold allocation and gold purchase operations. All PRC [People's Republic of China] gold producers are now required to sell their standard gold bullion through the Shanghai Gold Exchange, and prices of gold on the Shanghai Gold Exchange are determined by market demand and supply, which essentially converge with the price of gold in the international market.

SGE Bars Can’t Re-enter the Vaults

Fact three is that gold bars withdrawn from the SGE vaults are not allowed to return. This means that all numbers from bars that are deposited in the vaults are registered*, and these bars are blocked from re-entering. A clear overview of the structure of the Chinese gold market later on may help understand the function of this rule. Bear with me.
Article 23 from the SGE rulebook states:
第二十三条 会员及客户提取的黄金实物,不能再入库交易。
23. Gold in kind withdrawn by members and customers, can not be re-deposited. 
SGE gold bar 100 gram
SGE standard gold bar 100 gram
*This is what a SGE bar looks like.

1. 上海黄金交易所标准金条 Shanghai Gold Exchange Standard Gold Bar.

2. 上海黄金交易所标志 Shanghai Gold Exchange Logo.
3. 品牌标志 Brand Logo.
4. 金条品牌 Gold Bar Brand (In this case, it’s 泰山 Mount Tai, which is produced     by Shandong Gold).
5. 成色 Fineness.
6. 重量 Weight.
7. 金条编号 Gold Bar Number.
If you are a Chinese citizen you can buy gold or trade derivatives on the SGE only through a commercial bank. You’re required to open two SGE accounts at the bank, you pay 50 RMB and get 10-digit trading number. This number will stay with you forever, even if you switch banks. One of the accounts is the funds account, which records how much money you have deposited at the SGE, and the other is the gold account, which records how much gold you have. If you prefer to withdraw your physical gold from the vaults, beware of the second rule noted below.


ICBC SGE rule vaults
Screen dump from ICBC website


This rule has been confirmed to me by my Chinese contacts in the mainland and over the phone by the SGE. This is not unique, on the Borsa Istanbul the same rule applies. When owners of SGE bars, or other bars, would like to sell their gold through the SGE this has to be melted again and assayed. The new SGE bars (with a new registration number), are allowed to enter the SGE vaults. In this process the gold is counted as scrap supply by the measures the China Gold Market Report dictate. From the China Gold Market Report 2008:

ICBC bank gold bar
ICBC bank bar (gold)
Gold scrap

At present, gold scrap in China mainly is in two major forms: repurchase of gold bars, only applicable to brand gold bars in reference to real-time gold price, and repurchase of gold jewelry through retailers.



SGE Physical Delivery Equals Chinese Demand


As demonstrated in part one total demand in 2010 and 2011 reported in the China Gold Market Reports exactly equaled the amount of gold withdrawn from the SGE vaults over the same periods. Before we start connecting dots I would like to display more evidence regarding Chinese gold demand being equal to withdrawals from the SGE vaults.

As stated by the China Gold Market Report 2011 total demand was 1043 tons, according to the SGE Annual Report 2011 gold withdrawn from the SGE vaults was also 1043 tons:


Gold withdrawn from SGE vaults
Screen dump from SGE Annual Report 2011


The China Gold market Report 2010 states total demand was 837 tons, the SGE Annual Report 2010 shows a matching amount was withdrawn from the vaults:


Shanghai Gold Exchange gold withdrawn 2010
Screen dump from SGE Annual Report 2010


In the CGA Gold Yearbook 2008 it was stated total demand was 543.2 tons, as we can see from the following table (the first column relates to demand):

CGA gold demand 2008

首饰制造用金 = Jewelry
工业用金 = Industrial
金币生产用金 = Coins
金条囤积 = Bar hoarding
推断净投资 = Inferred net investment
合计 = Total

In the SGE Annual report 2008 we can read the following paragraph:

Affected by the global financial turbulence, growing investment demand for physical gold, including gold bars and coins, led to the rapid growth in spot gold trading and delivery volume. Spot gold traded through SGE totaled 1229.75 tonnes, an increase of 32.53%, or 301.83 tones compared to last year. Delivered Gold amounted up to 543.19 tonnes, an increase of 49.56%, or 180 tones compared to that of 2007. Physical delivery volume broke 500 tonnes for the first time and over passed the domestic gold production for a consecutive second year.
Shanghai Gold exchange gold withdraws 2008
Screen dump of SGE Annual Report 2008


In all these reports we can see the gold withdrawn from the SGE vaults exactly matching total demand. In the CGA Gold Yearbook 2007 it was even spelled out for us:
2007年,上海黄金交易所黄金出库量363.194 吨,即我国当年的黄金需求量,比2006年增长了48.02%,低于供给增长率8.82个百分点。
In 2007, the amount of gold withdrawn from the warehouses of the Shanghai Gold Exchange, gold demand of that year, was 363.194 tons of gold, compared to 2006 increased by 48.02 percent, 8.82 percentage points lower than the growth rate of supply.


Implications Of The Structure Of The Chinese Gold Market


When we put together the facts presented above we are able to draw conclusions that not only provide detailed insight into the Chinese gold market, but will also help us understand the reasoning behind its design.

In any country there can be three sorts of gold supply to meet demand: mine, import and scrap. In China mine and import supply must be sold through the SGE, scrap supply can be sold through the SGE. For me, interested in Chinese demand and import, scrap supply is the pivot of the Chinese gold market.

import + mine + scrap = total supply

total supply = total demand

total demand = SGE delivery

import + mine + scrap = total supply = SGE delivery = total demand



We already know total Chinese demand by the SGE delivery numbers, but we want to know import to measure Chinese demand relative to foreign demand and reserves. The amount of scrap supply over any given period can tell us import numbers as, import = SGE delivery – mine – scrap, whereof SGE delivery and mine numbers are published. Unfortunately it is impossible to be accurate about scrap, we’ll have to settle for an estimate.
The PBOC works the other way around, they calculate scrap by knowing import numbers. From the China Gold Market Report 2008:

Physical gold withdrawals on Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) topped 543.19 tons in the year, including gold imports of 81.44 tons by commercial banks, stock carry-over of 31.661 tons from 2007 and 282.007 tons of gold produced in the year. In theory, the gap of 148.082 tons was filled by recycled gold. Therefore the gold recycled in China in 2008 should have amounted to more than 100 tons in 2008.
We can read from the quote the PBOC uses the same basis equation (for the sake of simplicity I left stock carry-over out), which not only confirms once again that SGE delivery equals Chinese demand, it also confirms everything I’ve just stated about the structure of the market. Or the equation the PBOC presents us would not hold. Because fresh gold must be sold over the SGE and bars cant return to the SGE vaults without being counted as scrap, SGE delivery – fresh gold = scrap. Especially note In theory, the gap of 148.082 tons was filled by recycled gold”.  The PBOC calculates scrap by subtracting import and mine from SGE delivery.

The PBOC has designed the Chinese gold market like it is to centrally monitor and track all fresh gold entering China – a side effect is that we are handed the same tools. Fresh gold supply is controlled by the PBOC because it complements total reserves held amongst the population, one of the objectives of the central bank. China is granted to be supplied by fresh gold of the finest quality.

WGC Demand vs True Demand


As exposed in part one, GFMS (who provides the data for WGC demand trends) and the PBOC calculate demand on different levels. For example, GFMS measures newly-made jewelry, the PBOC measures the gold jewelers’ purchases at the SGE; hence some differences in jewelry demand. The same can be seen on the supply side, GFMS doesn’t measure the bars that are remelted to supply the SGE as scrap, where the PBOC does measure this as scrap. Narrow versus broad measurements. However, these differences do not explain the great disparity in total demand.

The big difference in total Chinese gold demand measured by Thomson Reuters GFMS and the PBOC is caused by net investment, disclosed by the PBOC as demand category six in the China Gold Market Reports. The other categories, jewelry, coin, bar and industrial, roughly coincide. So what is net investment?


Overview chinese gold market 2011


I had a phone call with the SGE a few weeks ago after which everything fell into place. The employee I spoke to told me net investment relates to gold withdrawn from the vaults by individual account holders. From here we can connect the remaining dots. According to my analysis the PBOC uses the net investment demand category to suppress demand from other categories – mainly bar hoarding.

As we all know the Chinese are very secretive about their gold dealings. China is one of the few countries that doesn’t publish its gold trade in regular customs reports and the PBOC updates their official gold reserves just once every six years. China likes to hoard in the dark, this is typical if you understand the Chinese mindset.

Around 2008 the State Council realized gold was more important than thought in 2002. They wanted to accelerate gold hoarding without drawing too much attention and without altering the structure of the market set up six years before. For this new strategy they commenced manipulating net investment numbers on the demand side and scrap on the supply side. Since 2007 SGE delivery remained equal to Chinese demand, though in the gold reports jewelry and bar demand was being suppressed by gushy net investment, and import was suppressed by overstated scrap (see overview chart above). Apparently GFMS was mislead by the PBOC to treat net investment as stock movement change at jewelers and the mint.
Have a look at some numbers from the past years I have collected from the gold reports and GFMS:


Chinese gold data


The numbers in red can be disputed. We can see net investment jumping from 18 tons in 2007, to 129 tons in 2008. From 2008 until 2013 net investment in total is over 2000 tons. GFMS’ statement about net investment being stock movement change is untenable.

From 2002 to 2007 scrap numbers from the PBOC and GFMS were equal. Then in 2008 PBOC scrap jumps nearly 80 tons from GFMS scrap, in 2011 the difference reaches 282 tons. These numbers are hard to swallow. Also bear in mind not all gold that enters Chinese refineries ends up at the SGE, as some is made into wire or powder for jewelry and industrial purposes. For these reasons I highly doubt PBOC scrap numbers since 2008.

Scrap numbers were overstated to suppress imports, this scheme cracked in 2011. Hong Kong net exported 335 tons of gold to the mainland in 2011, transcending the 277 tons the PBOC claims to have net imported that year. Implying import must have been more than 277 tons, and thus scrap must heave been less than 407 tons.

In the China Gold Market Report 2011 import is disclosed as others.

China gold supply 2011


2013 Total Chinese Demand


With a few weeks left on the calendar we can safely calculate total demand and supply numbers for 2013. WGC calculates Chinese demand will be roughly 1100 tons, SGE delivery will be 2192 tons.

WGC PBOC demand


The difference in the chart can be read as net investment, accounting for 1000 tons in 2013. Im curious how the PBOC is going to hide this demand in the China Gold Market Report 2013, if ever released, the China Gold Market 2012 has never been released either.

Suppose scrap supply is what the reports claim it is. Lets say 300 tons for 2013 (in 2011 it was 400 tons on record high gold prices). These would be the annualized numbers:

2146 tons  SGE delivery
410 tons mine
300 tons scrap
———————      -
1436 tons net import

Is that all? No. This excludes PBOC purchases of 500 tons (I have been told by all my sources the PBOC does not buy 1 gram of gold through the SGE) and jewelry imports from Hong Kong by mainland tourists – a phenomenon I will discuss in a future post. 2013 total Chinese demand including PBOC purchases will be well over 2500 tons and net import will likely reach 2000 tons.


http://www.silverdoctors.com

明年黃金看升 美股看跌

 

截至2013年12月12日,道指收市報15739,比2012年底收市指數13106上升了20%,黃金表現落後,同一期間由1675美元下跌至1225美元,下跌幅度26.9%。

股強金弱的趨勢明年可能逆轉,NedW Schmidt在12月9日刊登兩幅圖表,指出:第一,1945年至今,黃金與標普500指數的平均比率為1.2倍左右,見附圖(一)的黑?。目前黃金兌標普500指數的比率已跌至2008年以來的最低水平。

第二,倘若維持平均比率,美股不變,黃金將會上升70%;假如金價不變,標普500指數將會下跌40%,見附圖(二)。

總結:股強金弱的趨勢即將逆轉,加上黃金25周循環低位預期在2013年12月底出現,黃金走勢值得留意。








投機智慧 - 許沂光 2013年12月17日


免責聲明:以上分析,只供參考,投資買賣,必須審慎。

辨析人民幣外升內貶:漸進式升值必然結果



辨析人民幣“外升內貶”

人民幣“對外升值對內貶值”這一表面矛盾的現象實際上是內在統一的:它是人民幣漸進式升值的必然結果

  王慶/文

如果用一句話來概括自2005年以來中國貨幣環境的最重要特徵,恐怕沒有比人民幣“對外升值對內貶值”更準確的描述了。

人民幣“對外升值對內貶值”這一表面矛盾的現象實際上是內在統一的:它是人民幣漸進式升值的必然結果。在人民幣漸進性升值政策下,一方面有人民幣對外升值的現實,另一方面人民幣的漸進性升值非但沒有消除,反而強化了人民幣單邊升值預期。後者催生了居民和非居民對境內資產價格上漲的強烈預期,吸引了巨量內外部資本流入。流動性過剩加之經濟基本面的穩健,使產品和資產價格通貨膨脹壓力揮之不去, 即對內貶值。

如果在2005年匯改的時候,採取的是讓人民幣一次性大幅度跳升,徹底打破人民幣未來的單邊升值預期,然後進行有管理的浮動,後來很可能就不會有股市的泡沫,以及正在生成的房地產價格泡沫。在這種情形下,人民幣將只會有對外升值,而不會出現對內貶值。

我們不妨對匯改的歷史做個複盤。在2004年-2005年間,鑑於中國出口的高增長,外貿順差的持續擴大,外匯儲備迅速積累,無論是資本市場還是國際社會逐漸形成一個強烈共識:人民幣匯率被大幅低估。

當時,儘管沒有人能確切地知道人民幣匯率被低估的程度,市場上形成的一致預期是,如果把人民幣匯率放開,完全由市場決定,那麼人民幣對美元的匯率會在短期內大幅升值,少則15%,多則50%以上。如果這個預期真的實現了,那麼中國境內所有資產的美元價格都會在短時間內大幅升值。

  實際情況不然。在匯改之初,中國政府並沒有讓人民幣一次大幅度升值,而是宣佈在2005年7月22日讓人民幣對美元的匯率一次小幅升值僅2%,並開啟了人民幣對美元的長達八年多的漸進式升值過程。

人民幣匯改的啟動非但沒有消除,反而強化了市場對人民幣升值的強烈預期。同理, 也強化了“中國境內所有資產的美元價格都會大幅升值”的預期。既然這個預期無法直接通過匯率的調整來實現,市場就尋求其他方式間接表達這個預期:中國境內所有資產的人民幣價格都會大幅度升值。

資本市場參與者預期的變化對不同類型資產的價格影響的速度是不一樣的,一個市場的盤子越大,越有深度,流動性越強,通常其對預期變化的反應也就越快。一般來講,按反應速度的快慢順序通常是匯率市場最快,其次是債券市場和股票市場,不動產市場反應則相對較慢。由於當時的中國債券市場還很不發達,還基本上是銀行間市場, “中國境內資產的人民幣價格會大幅度升值”的預期首先體現在股票市場的快速上漲上。

試想,如果很多投資者都預期股市和房地產價格要漲20%,就會有大量資金進入市場。股市首先做出反應。如果股市在很短的時間內就上漲20%,這種賺錢效應就會大大提振投資者信心,再加上經濟基本面的穩健,隨後就會形成典型的資產價格自我實現式的上漲,直至把股市推向泡沫化階段。同樣的過程也在房地產市場上重複。房地產價格的反應總體上會比股市滯後,但一些市場化比較發達的一二線城市的房價會比三四線城市漲得​​早、漲得快。加之購房按揭貸款開始被廣泛使用,加槓桿更容易,使房價上漲的範圍大,持續時間長。

鑑於2003年後全球經濟的複蘇,同時中國加入WTO的積極效果開始顯現,中國經濟經歷了相當長一段時間的高速成長。在此背景下,無論是股市還是房地產市場的上漲都有基本面的支持。但是,經濟基本面的改善無法解釋資產價格如此快速的上漲,甚至出現泡沫化。 “對內貶值”之所以被廣為詬病,就是因為資產價格(尤其是房價)的上漲幅度遠超出人們收入的上漲幅度。

人民幣漸進式升值應該已經告一段落。依各種宏觀和國際收支指標判斷,目前人民幣匯率應該比較接近均衡水平。沒有了對外升值壓力的困擾,貨幣政策的工作重心可以轉向應對“對內貶值”。這也正是長期以來各方所尋求的中國貨幣政策獨立性應有之義。

如果當初匯改讓人民幣匯率一次大幅度升值,應該可以在相當程度上避免後續出現的資產價格泡沫及其對經濟帶來的諸多不良後果。但是,這樣的政策也會對中國的出口部門在短時期內造成巨大衝擊,對經濟增長和就業創造的負面影響恐怕也不可估量。兩個政策方案孰優孰劣,當下的我們也許根本就無法給出一個正確答案。

作者為上海重陽投資管理有限公司總裁

  【作者:王慶/文 】

中國走出美元陷阱的暗道中國=黃金




中國的新華社在2011年8月就美國發表了以下聲明:“應當引入對發行美元實行國際監督,建立一個新的、穩定和安全的全球儲備貨幣也是一個選擇,以避免任何單一貨幣所造成的災​​難。”

量化寬鬆(QE),至少部分地意味著美國在悄悄地對其債務違約。

中國持有1.27萬億美元美國國債和其他以美元計價的資產,使它成為美國最大的債主。其結果是,中國政府對影響其巨大持債的價值的貨幣政策特別敏感。

中國關注的另一個關鍵方面即中國是世界上各種自然資源最大消費國的事實。中國在黃金和鐵礦石方面的貿易超過世界貿易的50%,其他許多方面的消費接近50%,而它是第二大石油消費國,僅次於美國。

從20世紀70年代早期的原油市場開始,美國利用其經濟和軍事力量迫使世界進入一個奇怪的安排,要求各個國家必須用美元購買自然資源。這意味著,對於各種主要商品,各個國家必須採取買進美元才買資源的額外步驟。

這種狀況使中國陷入了困境。雖然它不缺少購買資源的美元,因為它與它的最大的貿易夥伴(美國)始終處於貿易順差狀態,但它尤其容易受到無限量化寬鬆政策、美元貶值的激進政策的風險威脅。

鑑於中國對大宗商品巨大的不斷增長需求,目前美元主導的國際貨幣安排已經不再是一個可行的選擇。

中國已經清楚地認識到它們的美元風險,並已作出回應,積極擴大在國際貿易中使用自己的貨幣——人民幣。

中國加緊努力,不只是為自己,而且是為中國的全球貿易夥伴為內置在國際商品貿易中的美元陷阱提供替代。中國本質上是為迫在眉睫的貨幣危機開發出一條退路,其正通過幾個關鍵方面來解決這個問題,如擴大在國際貿易中使用人民幣的範圍,同時發展一個強大的國內黃金市場。

在貨幣方面,與主要金融中心和貿易夥伴的貨幣互換協議使人民幣能通過其本國銀行隨時提供給商家。這使中國能夠為天然資源快速方便地結算交易,而無需購買美元。

這些掉期協議減少了中央和商業銀行持有美元的必要性,從而降低了與持有美元相關的貨幣貶值風險。

中國最大的掉期協議是與韓國623億美元的金額,第二大的是與歐洲央行608億美元的金額。這些協議的有效期為3年,通常是可續籤的。中國總共已與23個國家建立掉期協議,共計約為4126億美元,參與國的名單還在繼續增長。

新崛起的趨勢

另一種擴大使用人民幣的方法是通過貿易融資。這是指資本以現金、信貸、投資和其他資產的形式提供便利的行為,是在國際貿易流動中必不可少的。

據環球同業銀行金融電訊協會(該組織的俗稱為SWIFT)說,人民幣在10月趕上歐元,成為貿易融資中第二常用的貨幣。

雖然美元是迄今為止貿易融資使用最多的貨幣,佔全球交易的81.08%,但自去年以來出現的一個新興趨勢值得注意。

2012年1月,人民幣佔全球貿易融資的比例只有1.89%。 2013年10月,這一比例已經上升了4.6倍,達到8.66%。同一時期美元在此類別中的佔比從84.96%下跌至81.08%。

右圖中兩個餅圖突出了這個變化。乍一看似乎並不明顯,但我們相信它相當明顯地顯示出在國際貨幣秩序中的結構性轉移才剛剛開始。注意只是在22個月內使用中國人民幣的快速擴張。

針對這一發展,路透社報導說,“作為世界第二大經濟體的中國正在加快金融改革的步伐,以促進其貨幣面對香港以外的國際成員。中國的目標是提升人民幣的全球影響力,並減少對美元的依賴。”

中國=黃金

中國關注其外匯儲備組合,尤其是大量由美元組成部分的質量。正因為如此,中國正在積極地致力於外匯儲備多元化,以及發展世界上最大的黃金市場,使其公民遠離美元。

中國不僅打開生產和進口的黃金閘門,還在發展法律、機構、交易所、金融工具,並鼓勵其公民大規模進行黃金交易和擁有黃金。

同時,中國人民銀行正在以前所未有的速度增加黃金儲備,努力使其美元為主的外匯儲備多樣化。

預計中國人民銀行將在今年年底把600噸黃金添加到自己的儲備中,這大概是世界每年礦山生產(不包括中國的產量)的25%。

與中國人民銀行大量購買相關的是,10月份中國內地從香港的淨黃金進口量為131.19噸,創第二高的每月進口紀錄。

考慮到這一最新數據,中國內地僅通過香港已經進口1586噸黃金,或每年礦山供應量(再次不包括中國的產量)的66%。

我們在7月發表的題為《中國購買巴里克》的文章中說,中國渴望獲得黃金,其既定的戰略是發展它們的黃金市場,會導致中國不可避免地通過收購一家主要的黃金生產商,以確保這個黃金供給的一部分。當時我們假定的邏輯目標就是巨頭巴里克黃金公司。

近日,巴里克黃金公司的董事會宣布,約翰·桑頓——高盛的一位前總裁——將是它們的下一任主席。據稱桑頓試圖與中國公司建立合作夥伴關係。

一個潛在的利益相關方據說是中國投資公司(中投公司),負責投資中國龐大的外匯儲備的主權財富基金。桑頓恰好是它們的國際顧問委員會的成員。

這也可能只是一個時間問題。

我們相信中國正在採取行動,將自己定位到一個新的國際貨幣體系中。中國需要貨幣轉移發生,中國積極推動人民幣國際化,並擁有大量的黃金儲備支持它。

中國正在採取具體步驟重新引入黃金,將其作為世界貨幣、貿易和全球經濟穩定的核心組成部分。鑑於中國的經濟實力,尤其是在自然資源領域,這支撐金價上漲並為這種黃色金屬提供一個非常強大的靠山。

在此背景下,我們認為黃金,特別是黃金礦業股,被嚴重低估。


http://finance.ifeng.com 

摩根大通公司賬戶在Comex黃金交易圖表對比

(圖解:紅色為售出綠色為買入右邊數軸為交易量橙色為金價)



Jesse's Café America給出了一張芝加哥商業交易所(CME)數據顯示的摩根大通(JP Morgan)的公司賬戶在Comex的黃金交易圖表對比。  

相關報導:摩根大通嘉誠證券的分析師上週五發表報告,將他們對黃金價格2014年的預測值降低了10%,至每盎司1263美元。未來一年將是聯儲縮減量化寬鬆項目,以及美國低通貨膨脹為標誌的一年,其下行風險還將會受到生產者物價對沖再現的放大。報告將2014年黃金價格的預測值降低10%至每盎司1263美元;2015年的金價預期則是降低12%至每盎司1275美元。不過報告將白銀價格的2014年和2015年預期分別維持在每盎司21.38美元和每盎司22美元不變。


圖解:摩根大通公司賬戶的淨持倉和金價對比右邊數軸為交易量橙色為金價

從圖表來看,摩根大通在2月有巨大的期貨交割量,此後有所沉寂,再4月又有大量交割。在8月摩根大通停止交割,買入了一些黃金,而金價在當時也有所反彈。這些被買入的黃金被當作是摩根大通在回補之前的交割。此後金價又開始下跌,12月摩根大通又有大量買入。就今年而言,摩根大通的淨持倉為7600手,這較4至7月間其持有的1.46萬手有大幅下跌。  


【相關報導:摩根大通嘉誠證券的分析師上週五發表報告,將他們對黃金價格2014年的預測值降低了10%,至每盎司1263美元。未來一年將是聯儲縮減量化寬鬆項目,以及美國低通貨膨脹為標誌的一年,其下行風險還將會受到生產者物價對沖再現的放大。報告將2014年黃金價格的預測值降低10%至每盎司1263美元;2015年的金價預期則是降低12%至每盎司1275美元。不過報告將白銀價格的2014年和2015年預期分別維持在每盎司21.38美元和每盎司22美元不變。

儲局資產迫近四萬億大關

石林
美國聯邦儲備局公開市場委員會(FOMC)將在本周二及三舉行會議,金融及商品市場將之視為周內最重要的事件,這是該局今年最後一次議訂息率。
有 人估計聯儲局可能會在本月宣布逐步減購債券計劃,即所謂Tapering;亦有人認為該計劃最快要在明年首季才會進行。這樣去推估聯儲局的政策動向,敝欄 將之稱為是玩「掰花瓣」遊戲。筆者數年前曾向一批忠實讀者說過,一些好心人提醒什麼「密切關注某某消息」,這對小投資者其實是沒有意義的,因為我們是屬於 應該知悉這些消息的人中之最後一群!要在市場波動後才知道其大概內容,完全是明日黃花。 
GLD持金減近四成
敝欄一直倡議追蹤有關原始數據及其趨向,以作出自己的判斷。
在 FOMC今年最後一次會議前夕,敝欄告訴各位,聯邦儲備資產又創新高,迫近4萬億元(美元.下同)大關!該局的資產負債表規模到上周三膨脹至3.993萬 億元;其中持有國庫券和MBS的價值亦同創新高,分別為2.185萬億元和1.482萬億元。此外,同日的美國貨幣基礎亦增升到3.715萬億元的新高。
在數項關鍵的原始數據持續同創新高之際,聯儲局是否來個急煞車甚或開倒車,請各位自行判斷。
QE3 繼續或實行Tapering,對金市來說其實不是最重要的事情了,一年多來的實際行情早就這樣告訴我們。與聯儲資產持續創新高具反諷的事是,近一年最大的 黃金ETF(GLD)持金量從高峰不斷向下滑降,到上周四及五只餘下827.6噸【圖】,減幅達525.75噸或38.84%,而同期金價下跌了 27.4%。要知道,金價與GLD持金量變化是同向但非同步,金價在前年9月6日見頂,至今積累跌幅為34.3%。西方投資者對黃金投資的興趣大減,是金 價反覆疲軟的一個重要原因,此趨勢未因聯儲局的QE3而改變,反隨歐洲央行資產負債表收縮以及歐羅區再陷通縮邊緣而持續。
簡言之,金市中期走勢與聯儲局是否繼續QE無很大關係,但短期市勢會受到影響。假如稍後FOMC會議不明確提及政策取向,金市將繼續目前的牛熊雙方反覆爭持局面,除非即時實施Tapering,市勢才會增添沽壓。
上周金市在日前力守1210元水平基礎下反彈至1267元高位,其後又回落至1220元偏低位,收市再回彈至1238.7元,比前周回揚8元,忽上忽落的模式未有改變。
摩根大通「反常」收金
值 得一提的是,上周二大幅彈升主要是對沖基金作淡倉回補所致,其在期金市場的淨好倉量回增,但生產者仍「反常地」持淨好倉。此外,摩根大通本月亦「反常地」 收取黃金期貨交割,佔總量逾九成,但仍持有約7600張待交貨合約。因此除非有重大不利消息,金市短期在1210元水平建立了支持,新支持在1220元至 1224元地帶已形成,日內阻力在1244元,但仍有可能再上試1256元至1260元。
銀市上周曾挑戰20.5元重要阻力,終不果而回,收市報19.68元,比前周微升0.14元。同樣值得一提,對沖基金到上周二回復持淨好倉,雖然數量輕微但改變了「反常」局面。
類似地,銀市短期在18.9元水平建立了支持,新支持位在19.3元至19.4元地帶已形成,日內阻力位在19.9元,仍有機會再上試20.3元至20.4元。
敝欄向來不迷信大行,但摩根大通幾乎操控了COMEX期金市場的交收,該行的動向不宜忽視。