2026年2月3日星期二

白銀:瑞銀-中國基金緊急停止與全球拋售有關


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Silver: Emergency Halt of UBS-China Fund Tied to Global Selloff

By Vince Lanci

China Sets The Price Now

GFN – SHANGHAI

Trading in a major China-listed silver fund was halted for a full session on January 30 as regulators moved to contain price distortions, while global silver prices fell sharply from record highs amid elevated volatility and tighter derivatives margin requirements.

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China’s Shenzhen Stock Exchange suspended trading for the entire day on January 30 in the UBS SDIC Silver Futures Fund LOF, according to an official fund announcement. The notice stated that trading would be halted from the market open through the close as part of exchange risk-control measures.

“该基金将于2026年1月30日开市起停牌至收市。”
(“The fund will be suspended from market open to market close on January 30, 2026.”)
— SDIC Silver LOF official announcement, cited by Sina Finance

Chinese financial media reported that the halt followed sustained abnormal trading conditions, with the fund’s secondary-market price diverging materially from its net asset value. Coverage described the suspension as a regulatory response to excessive premiums and repeated risk warnings rather than a change in the underlying structure of the fund.

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At the same time, silver prices in international markets recorded one of their largest single-day declines after reaching historic highs earlier in the week. Reuters reported a sharp reversal across precious metals during the January 30 session.

“Gold, silver and copper prices dropped sharply on Friday… Silver dropped 11% to $103.40, after peaking at $121.60.”
— Reuters, Metals Markets Wrap, January 30

Market data showed extreme intraday volatility, with spot silver falling back toward the $100 per ounce level after touching record highs the prior day.

Derivatives market conditions also tightened during the period. CME Group confirmed that it had raised margin requirements on silver futures contracts in response to heightened volatility and rapidly rising prices earlier in January.

“Margins will rise to 11% of notional from the current 9% for non-heightened risk profiles, while heightened risk profile margins will be raised to 12.1%.”
— CME Group margin notice, reported by Mining.com

CME described the changes as routine risk-management adjustments designed to ensure orderly market functioning during periods of exceptional price movement.

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CME and Shenzen exchanges

The January 30 session combined regulatory intervention in China-listed commodity funds, sharp price corrections in global silver markets, and tighter derivatives margin conditions, all occurring after a rapid, record-setting rally in precious metals earlier in the month.

Market Structure Mechanics

Market participants familiar with exchange-traded commodity products and futures market plumbing highlighted several structural effects stemming from the January 30 fund halt, emphasizing mechanics.

**silver: Emergency Halt Of Ubs China Fund Tied To Global Selloff

First, industry professionals noted that halting a fund while the underlying commodity continues to trade materially increases risk for fund holders. Traders pointed out that the absence of secondary-market pricing during the session removed the ability of the UBS trader to manage exposure dynamically, concentrating price and liquidity risk into the reopening window. As one derivatives trader put it, the halt “freezes the wrapper, not the asset,” leaving holders exposed to NAV moves they cannot respond to in real time.

Second, sources close to ETF and LOF operations said that such halts interrupt speculative momentum within the fund vehicle itself, particularly when the product has been trading at a significant premium to NAV. By suspending trading, (risk/pseudo) arbitrage and momentum flows are paused, and reopening typically forces a reconciliation between NAV, secondary-market pricing, and redemption demand. Market professionals stressed that this process often reduces speculative excess in the fund, even if it does not alter the underlying commodity’s physical supply and demand.

Third, traders active in futures markets emphasized that freezing the fund while leaving futures markets open can shift adjustment pressure elsewhere. With the fund temporarily non-redeemable, price discovery and risk transfer continue primarily through futures and related derivatives. Several participants noted that this dynamic can accelerate position adjustments in leveraged futures accounts, particularly when margin requirements are rising and volatility remains elevated. But it still does not guarantee the LOF will shrink its NAV premium

One seasoned trader close to the action speculated:

This fund will likely go the way of all funds like PSLV that attract interest.. it will be castrated financially. You are witnessing a stealth global capital control on Silver. Best you not use derivatives.

That trader concluded with: If you want to own silver.. Buy physical. A bird in your hand is worth 2 in the bush.

GoldFix Speculates:

Taken together, and assuming the facts reported are true, industry participants characterize the January 30 actions as possibly necessary from a market-order perspective to bring the fund back toward reasonable trading levels as China’s primary silver exposure vehicle, but structurally asymmetric in execution. By halting the fund while futures markets remained fully active, the adjustment burden was deferred and displaced rather than resolved. The fund’s premium may or may not have been reduced upon reopening com Monday, but during the session itself the broader silver market absorbed the pressure, contributing to a disorderly unwind of leveraged long positions in futures and related instruments.

While communication among international exchanges during periods of stress would not be surprising, the outcome was clear: the market was managed inefficiently in pursuit of fund-level stability, transferring stress outward into global futures markets. If nothing else, the episode reinforces a point long argued by GoldFix since 2023: the Shanghai price is now the global price and that physical is king.

擔心實體白銀失去流動性?


 


2026年2月1日星期日

白銀暴跌31%無人管,上漲卻處處受阻?

 


中國金銀實物定價與國際價脫鈎



全球貴金屬期貨價格急挫(黃金約5075美元/安士,銀約99美元/安士),但中國京東平台實物金銀條價格維持高位(黃金5720美元/安士,銀163美元/安士),顯示中國實物需求強烈。

- 金條溢價約13%,銀條高達65%,反映實物市場脫離紙上交易,可能因經濟不確定性令投資者囤積實物。

- 回覆討論COMEX價格同中國零售價差距,部分用戶視西方市場為「假價」,突顯全球貴金屬定價分歧。




白銀40年來閃崩35%暴跌

 Here is the full explanation of how the biggest exploit in the history of precious metals likely unfolded 👇🏻


Comex futures price settlement at the Comex is based on a VWAP between 13:24 to 13:25EST 


LBMA price settlement instead happens at 12:00 UK time


Most of Silver OTC contracts settle using the LBMA reference and many OTC contracts expire into month end. 


On the 30th Jan LBMA silver price benchmark settled at 103.19$ while the Comex Benchmark a few hours later settled at 78.29$.


The following chart (credit @KingKong9888 ) is a great representation of how bullion banks hedge and transact in the silver market (both paper and physical). 


It is an open secret now how many banks and brokers were under water on their silver positions, gold and other precious metals especially after the rally in January. Beware this flow chart roughly applies to all these metals that all crashed on Friday (not silver alone).


What’s even more remarkable is how precocious metals crashed on Friday in isolation, stocks, bonds and other commodities were totally unaffected. Anyone that understands any basic of macro and markets knows how this is logically wrong.


Let’s add one more piece to the puzzle now: on Friday the OI at the Comex decreased by 8k contracts at the end of the day. Assuming for simplicity the price differential between the LBMA and the Comex as a reference. That means banks were able to extract ~1bn$ gain from their shorts pushing the Comex price through the floor after the LBMA settlement. 


Furthermore the $SLV continued trading after the LBMA benchmark settlement creating almost a 20% discount to NAV because of that. Here is the other trick the banks pulled. If you have to settle a lot of physical contracts at the LBMA but you don’t have the metal, because of such a discount to NAV, AP banks could buy $SLV shares in the open market from panic selling investors, tender the shares to claim bars at 103.19$ and make a killing in the process. 


Not surprisingly, $SLV shares count increased by ~51m shared from Thursday to Friday according to iShares. Because of the NAV discount banks extracted up to 1.5bn$ of profits exploiting this ETF assuming they bought up all that shares differential and then turned around to claim silver bars at a much higher price for contract settlement purposes (keep an eye on the data on the metals redemption from the ETF). 


The last piece of the puzzle is the exploit against Leveraged silver ETFs like $AGQ that have been forced into liquidating a vast number of derivative contracts during the crash. Here brokers made a killing too, but other people here on X already covered this matter well so no need for me to say more.


All in all, it’s fair to estimate how banks and brokers made up to 5bn$ of profits (or lowered their pre existing losses depending on how you look at it) orchestrating one of the biggest price manipulation in the history to abnormally crash the price of silver in a single day. Surely they made more if you consider the same dynamics happened on gold platinum and palladium.


However this left the precious metals market in a massive price dislocation not only between physical and paper, but also across financial products and exchanges. 


Trading resumes in less than 24 hours and there is a chance that what’s about to happen is going to be even more historic than Friday’s events because China and India won’t stop buying silver because of the severe industrial shortage they are dealing with.






2026年1月31日星期六

美國鷹揚金銀幣溢價2026


 



圖表顯示2009–2026年美國銀鷹(Silver Eagle)同金鷹(Gold Eagle)相對spot價嘅歷史溢價:


- **銀幣**:目前溢價約$9(約8%),spot ~$111–115,零售價$100–$103左右。較2020年高峰($100+,70–80%)回落,但仍高於正常$2–$6。

- **金幣**:溢價約$200–$650(視來源,%約4–13%),spot ~$5,000–$5,100,零售價$5,100–$5,200+。%創近10年高位。


**重點**:即使貴金屬價已處歷史高位,實物溢價仍然堅挺,反映投資者對系統風險、通脹、地緣局勢嘅強烈避險需求。銀偏零售恐慌,金偏宏觀配置。今次高溢價持續時間長,唔似單一事件,結構性轉變跡象明顯。


長線持有實物鷹揚幣仍然有吸引力,但高溢價買入成本高,建議監察供應恢復同spot走勢。


#貴金屬 #銀 #金 #避險 #投資