2011年6月12日星期日

Silver ETF gets help from its friends

http://money.msn.com/
美銀BAC)的大摩(MS)的小摩​​(摩根大通和黑石(BLR)“逆勢買白銀 ETF的-薩爾瓦多成了它目前最大的4個股東說明什麼

Silver ETF gets help from its friends

This fund's 4 largest holders support the metal's price by buying the physical commodity when prices fall.

By TheStreet Staff on Wed, Jun 8, 2011 12:56 PM
Image: Silver Bars (© Corbis)By Dan Dicker, TheStreet

Silver and BlackRock's silver ETF, iShares Silver Trust ETF (SLV), have been the target of some wild rumors in the past several months.

The crazy stories have run the gamut around the financial blogosphere. One has JPMorgan (JPM) as a puppet of the Federal Reserve, establishing a huge proprietary bet against silver designed to pressure the dollar and reduce costs of monetary easing. Others have BlackRock (BLK) unable to satisfy its share demand with real silver stockpiles. Many observers claim that legitimate storage for the metal doesn't come anywhere near the almost 11,400 tons of physical silver that the trust reported holding at its extremes in late April of this year.

I don't need to go anywhere near those rumors. The facts about SLV alone are enough to make a great case for the manipulating effects of the ETF on the price of silver and the strong positives those manipulations can deliver to an investor who doesn't mind being part of a grand plan -- as long as it's a profitable one.
Let's have a quick look at the mechanics of this relatively new ETF and how it positively affects silver prices. SLV looks to represent shares with real physical silver, not derivatives or stocks of silver miners. The mechanism for connecting shares of the trust to the price of real silver is relatively simple.

As investor interest increases, sending shares of the trust higher, BlackRock continues to issue more shares, using the extra cash to buy and stockpile physical silver ingots. The speed with which it will issue shares and increase its physical holdings is dependent solely on how fast the differential moves between the actual price of physically traded silver and SLV's share price.

In fund-speak, this is called tracking the net asset value, or NAV, of the fund. If the NAV tracks too high to spot prices, shares go out to satisfy demand for the fund.

And appetites for SLV have been stunning. Since its inception in 2006 and initial stockpiling of 650 tons, SLV reached its 11,400-ton peak just over a month ago, an amount that represents almost half of all the silver being globally mined in a single year. Of course, this institutional hoarding system was a tremendous added influence to the price of silver, which recently peaked at more than $48 an ounce on April 29.

But what about the past month? With silver's price losing more than $10 an ounce, shouldn't SLV be working in reverse? If shares are normally issued as appetite for silver increases, shouldn't the number of shares and the stockpiled amount of silver decrease as the retail and institutional investor sell out?

It should and it is, but only to a certain degree. The mechanism of SLV implies that the fund would never need to sell any of its physical holdings, as long as the cash price keeps up with the share price -- or to put it in fund-speak again, if the NAV doesn't become too discounted.

So as long as appetite for the fund keeps relatively steady even as silver prices decline, the trust can continue to hold the enormous tonnage they've accumulated. That's good for long-term holders and the managers, of course, because silver prices are buoyed as hoarded stockpiles increase.

Recently, though, retail and institutional appetite did take a dip. But as silver prices swooned, other buyers have come in to take up much of the slack of the share selling that came with it.

But who were those buyers? Conspiracy advocates around the blogosphere won't be surprised to learn it's been the investment banks and trust managers themselves -- the sales force of the fund.

As evidenced by the 13F Edgar filings, SLV's four largest holders have now shifted hands from large institutional funds and into the hands of Bank of America (BAC), Morgan Stanley (MS), JPMorgan and Blackrock.

Besides using cheap funds from the discount window to make these purchases courtesy of Uncle Sam, they also manage to do much of their buying at a discount to NAV, in essence grabbing an immediate advantage compared to spot metal prices. It's become a tidy game.

And as retail and institutional interest in silver comes back, these banks and investment firms are well-placed to resell their accumulated shares at their leisure, above NAV and directly through their own sales teams inside their supposed Chinese walls.

It might sound shady, but it's all entirely legal.

The bottom line for the retail investor is that the trust managers and bank sales teams now have organic support from the proprietary desks at their own investment banks -- and can almost assure that silver won't get decimated in a deeper commodity pullback.
It is also true that silver is a minuscule market, and even tiny further interest generated by those sales teams will result in further spiking of prices, despite silver's already lofty numbers.

I hate to do it -- I don't like the system and it ought to be forbidden -- but silver and SLV look like a one-way street you can't afford not to be pointed down.

At the time of publication, Dicker had no positions in the securities mentioned in this article.

於此同時白銀持倉報告顯示

 可見,5月26日當時所說的,5月17日到24日的見底預判已經得到初步的驗證以投行為主的swap dealer其重新開始加空倉但仍處於極低水平說明價格見底開始回升而同時生產商(PM卻減少套期保值的賣空頭寸目前賣空頭寸是今年來最少可見其對未來白銀走勢相當看好而更加樂觀的是高價格的主力-基金們(MM目前的做多力量仍然非常低也是剛剛創下今年新低而後緩慢回升但仍然比今年1月28日前後還低說明不堅定的多頭目前已經被震出局還沒有重新加入進來目前的多頭雖少但大多是堅定的長期多頭這種情況正是將來大漲前的基礎形態


當然白銀前期跌幅過大有傷人氣雖然目前初步可能見底但不排除是個大平底鍋的可能即在底部會震盪一陣子尤其是夏季是黃金的淡季白銀首飾方面也是淡季要到8月下旬開始才進入傳統的旺季採購這期間低位進入都是可以的但短期不要指望漲幅能有多大除非大本的QE3或者希臘的債務問題憋不住了夏天就出來否則大的漲勢估計還是在秋天


最後說一句,說賣了索羅斯 SPDR來的股份因而說明他不看好黃金的先去查查人家是3月31日之前賣的那時的金價和元旦時差不多與後來4個月的漲幅無關如果他認為3月份的金價高估有泡沫而賣出為何月份不早出手呢反正價格也差不多而且這個黃金 ETF基金SPDR來持有股份超過10萬股的1萬盎司可以要求實物交割即不是賣出股份換美元而是直接換取實物這兩種拋出其實際意義和對黃金後市的看法是大相徑庭的同時索羅斯買礦業的黃金股已經說明不少問題了

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