環球同業銀行金融電訊協會（SWIFT）週三稱，人民幣已取代俄羅斯盧布和丹麥克朗，成為全球第13大國際支付貨幣。
WSJ援引SWIFT稱，今年1月份的人民幣支付金額同比激增171%。
但SWIFT拒絕給出人民幣支付金額的具體數字，只是說其增速幾乎是其他貨幣的兩倍。 1月份，人民幣在世界貨幣支付額中的比重創下0.63%的紀錄值。
去年1月份，人民幣還僅排在第20位。
SWIFT說，排名的上升表明，香港、新加坡和倫敦離岸人民幣交易中心的發展極大推動了人民幣國際支付金額的增加。
SWIFT是一個由會員機構擁有的合作組織。全球209個國家/地區的9,700多家銀行機構、證券機構和企業客戶借助該系統，每天交換數百萬條標準化金融報文。
2013年2月27日星期三
CFTC Cuts Deal with Precious Metals Scammers
Four precious metals firms and three people were recently charged
with engaging in illegal precious metals transactions. These activities
were part of a multimillion-dollar scheme. Those initially implicated
in the scam are “defendants” in a lawsuit filed by the US Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The latest group of alleged
fraudsters are mere “respondents,” to regulatory orders, as they struck
deals with the regulators.
Barclay Metals and Universal Clearing were purportedly precious metals firms on Wall Street. In actuality, these corporations were operated in Florida and were never registered with the commission.
Secured Precious Metals International, a Delaware corporation that was also operated in Florida, and Secured Precious Metals Management, an actual Florida corporation, were also never registered with the commission.
The CFTC has charged these four firms and their owners with engaging in illegal off-exchange financed transactions.
Under the scheme, Barclay Metals and Secured Precious Metals International solicited a leveraged purchase program. Customers were led to believe that they could purchase silver, gold and other metals by paying as little as 20 percent of the purchase price. The remaining portion was allegedly financed by Secured Precious Metals International and Barclay. The metal was then supposedly stored on the customers’ behalf at an independent depository.
Under Dodd-Frank, financed retail commodity transactions must be executed in accordance with the rules of a board of trade, and then only by qualified parties.
In these cases, those requirements were not met, so the CFTC found them to be illegal.
Furthermore, while money was collected from customers, according to the CFTC, trades were never made. The money was instead given to Hunter Wise.
Hunter Wise refers to group of companies — and their principals — that operated as a common enterprise, according to the CFTC. Its business was supposed to be precious metals trading, but regulators allege that these unregistered entities were really “the orchestrator” of a precious metals scheme that is estimated to have brought in at least $46 million thanks to “dealers” such as the aforementioned parties who operated in Florida.
In December, the CFTC filed a lawsuit against Hunter Wise and other companies and individuals for participation in this scam. The announcement portrayed the actions in a very negative fashion, with the agency expressly alleging fraud and deception.
With regards to the latest actions, the CFTC clearly notes that the parties engaged in the same type of behavior. In addition to outlining how they intercepted money on false pretenses, the CFTC notes that “[t]he Respondents’ retail customers never owned, possessed, or received title to the physical commodities that they believed they purchased, no funds were expended by Respondents or Hunter Wise to purchase physical commodities for the customers and no physical commodities were stored for the customers.”
Yet, the acts of the those most recently implicated are portrayed in a much different light. They are not described as deceptive or fraudulent. The only time the word “fraud” is used is when describing the goals of Dodd-Frank. The regulators try to paint the main issue as the failure to comply with the trading rules — not the scamming of individuals.
The benefits of snitching
This change in presentation appears to be one of the benefits of a practice commonly referred to as “snitching.” And it not only has the ability to alter regulators’ vocabulary and focus, but also seems to have the ability to minimize the action they take.
The CFTC agreed to settle these recently announced cases without requiring any admission or denials from the respondents. The terms of that agreement prohibit the parties from directly or indirectly making public statements denying the CFTC’s findings. The parties must also agree to stop engaging in illegal activities and are barred from trading for five years.
Furthermore, they agreed to cooperate “fully and expeditiously” with the CFTC in this action and any action related to the subject matter, including testifying.
The CFTC’s orders, which do not include civil monetary penalties, acknowledge the respondents’ substantial cooperation, the CFTC’s press release states.
In the previous Hunter Wise case, which named 20 defendants, the CFTC announced continuing litigation as the agency is seeking preliminary and permanent civil injunctions and remedial relief, including restitution to customers.
David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement, said “[h]ere is a prime example of how the Dodd-Frank Act provided the Commission with additional strong authority to go after wrong-doers, such as, as alleged in the complaint, individuals who prey on people looking to make retail investments in commodities like gold and silver. We will use this new authority to the fullest extent possible.”
Regulators have now shown they can pick and choose when they will stand behind those words. That certainly cannot be encouraging for those who have long waited for the CFTC to take a stand against major firms who are believed to be manipulating the precious metal markets.
Barclay Metals and Universal Clearing were purportedly precious metals firms on Wall Street. In actuality, these corporations were operated in Florida and were never registered with the commission.
Secured Precious Metals International, a Delaware corporation that was also operated in Florida, and Secured Precious Metals Management, an actual Florida corporation, were also never registered with the commission.
The CFTC has charged these four firms and their owners with engaging in illegal off-exchange financed transactions.
Under the scheme, Barclay Metals and Secured Precious Metals International solicited a leveraged purchase program. Customers were led to believe that they could purchase silver, gold and other metals by paying as little as 20 percent of the purchase price. The remaining portion was allegedly financed by Secured Precious Metals International and Barclay. The metal was then supposedly stored on the customers’ behalf at an independent depository.
Under Dodd-Frank, financed retail commodity transactions must be executed in accordance with the rules of a board of trade, and then only by qualified parties.
In these cases, those requirements were not met, so the CFTC found them to be illegal.
Furthermore, while money was collected from customers, according to the CFTC, trades were never made. The money was instead given to Hunter Wise.
Hunter Wise refers to group of companies — and their principals — that operated as a common enterprise, according to the CFTC. Its business was supposed to be precious metals trading, but regulators allege that these unregistered entities were really “the orchestrator” of a precious metals scheme that is estimated to have brought in at least $46 million thanks to “dealers” such as the aforementioned parties who operated in Florida.
In December, the CFTC filed a lawsuit against Hunter Wise and other companies and individuals for participation in this scam. The announcement portrayed the actions in a very negative fashion, with the agency expressly alleging fraud and deception.
With regards to the latest actions, the CFTC clearly notes that the parties engaged in the same type of behavior. In addition to outlining how they intercepted money on false pretenses, the CFTC notes that “[t]he Respondents’ retail customers never owned, possessed, or received title to the physical commodities that they believed they purchased, no funds were expended by Respondents or Hunter Wise to purchase physical commodities for the customers and no physical commodities were stored for the customers.”
Yet, the acts of the those most recently implicated are portrayed in a much different light. They are not described as deceptive or fraudulent. The only time the word “fraud” is used is when describing the goals of Dodd-Frank. The regulators try to paint the main issue as the failure to comply with the trading rules — not the scamming of individuals.
The benefits of snitching
This change in presentation appears to be one of the benefits of a practice commonly referred to as “snitching.” And it not only has the ability to alter regulators’ vocabulary and focus, but also seems to have the ability to minimize the action they take.
The CFTC agreed to settle these recently announced cases without requiring any admission or denials from the respondents. The terms of that agreement prohibit the parties from directly or indirectly making public statements denying the CFTC’s findings. The parties must also agree to stop engaging in illegal activities and are barred from trading for five years.
Furthermore, they agreed to cooperate “fully and expeditiously” with the CFTC in this action and any action related to the subject matter, including testifying.
The CFTC’s orders, which do not include civil monetary penalties, acknowledge the respondents’ substantial cooperation, the CFTC’s press release states.
In the previous Hunter Wise case, which named 20 defendants, the CFTC announced continuing litigation as the agency is seeking preliminary and permanent civil injunctions and remedial relief, including restitution to customers.
David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement, said “[h]ere is a prime example of how the Dodd-Frank Act provided the Commission with additional strong authority to go after wrong-doers, such as, as alleged in the complaint, individuals who prey on people looking to make retail investments in commodities like gold and silver. We will use this new authority to the fullest extent possible.”
Regulators have now shown they can pick and choose when they will stand behind those words. That certainly cannot be encouraging for those who have long waited for the CFTC to take a stand against major firms who are believed to be manipulating the precious metal markets.
J.C. Parets九圖分析黃金市場下跌現狀
所以，JC Parets認為，不妨還是把關注點放在價格上。接下來，他用一些精華圖表分析了黃金市場。首先，下圖展示的是數十年內金價在計入通脹因素調整後的價格走勢，JC Parets 表示，這幅圖是為了讓大家清楚的意識到現在金價所處的位置：
JC Parets表示，“在我看來，黃金在過去一年半的時間內似乎在一個相對合理的水平停留下來了。過去18個月內，金價下跌約20%，並且已經很長時間沒有再創出歷史新高或者新低了，相比於過去10年金價上漲的600%，這20%的修正是絕對正常的。”接下來的這張記錄每周平均金價變化的圖表顯示出了本世紀目前為止黃金價格的瘋狂上漲，有趣的是，圖中的每一次峰值連線竟如此平整。然而，金價上行趨勢支持線顯示未來金價的下跌還有可能出現。“從圖來看，1450甚至1150都是有可能觸及的水平。這並不算是預測或者價格目標，但是我認為忽視這一點也是一種不負責任的態度。”
然後再看一下近期的支持面。下圖為每日金價變化走勢，顯示出兩個重要的走勢線都在本月遭到突破。如果幾週之內兩大支持面都遭遇突破，從來都不會是什麼好事，這顯然意味著很大的拋售壓力。好消息是目前金價已經處於18個月內新低了；而壞消息是，這已經是金價第四次觸及這個水平了，越頻繁的試水這個點， 那麼這個防線遭遇突破的可能性就越大。目前英鎊的情況就證明了這個道理：
然後再來看一下每周金價平均走勢變化。下圖顯示，如果以2008年觸底水平作為標準，那麼38.2%的斐波納契回撤理論（Fibonacci）支持面為1450美元，而61.8%斐波納契回撤理論支持面為1150美元：
下圖是目前為止黃金VS金礦對比圖，今年伊始，這一走勢就已經突破了此前持續將近一年的“旗形區域”，甚至突破了去年5月的峰值：
而鉑金/黃金價格比率也出現了比較有趣的變化，也突破了一些關鍵的支撐面：
下圖是道指/黃金比率圖。 JC Parets表示，這是他最為珍藏的一張圖，BI主編Joe Weisenthal常問他，“如果你被困在沙漠中，只有一張圖可以看，你會選擇哪張圖？”他選的就是這張：
目前上圖道指和金價的比率在8.86附近，比去年8月低於6的水平有了很多增長。預計有可能這一比例未來還有達到10的潛力。下圖為短期內道指/金價比率走勢，今年初，這一指標也出現了一次比較關鍵的突破：
交易部門表現不佳高盛準備啟動新一輪裁員
路透援引消息人士報導稱，高盛計劃最早在本週開始新一輪裁員，涉及範圍包括股票交易部門和固定收益部門，其中前者的裁員規模將會更大。
高盛通常在每年的這個時間段裁撤5%表現最差的僱員。但路透說今年一些部門的裁員幅度可能會更大，尤其是股票交易部門，因為目前其成交量和盈利均十分疲弱。今年迄今為止，高盛對美國主要證券交易所的股票交易量已下降7.2%。
路透消息源稱高盛去年遭受重創的固定收益交易部門，今年交易量有所改善，因此裁員幅度可能會少於5%。
公司發言人David Wells說：
“某些領域中的市場活動已加快，我們仍將把重點放在謹慎管理支出並分配資源上。”他沒有就裁員問題作出回答。
高盛即將展開新一輪裁員表明，雖然華爾街公司顯現出一些復甦跡象，但銀行仍尋求通過削減員工數量來增加獲利能力。
包括摩根士丹利，美國銀行，花旗和瑞信在的華爾街巨頭，在過去幾年裡一直在削減員工隊伍。而與此同時監管收緊則在加大銀行的成本。
高盛在過去兩年以來已經裁員9%，或相當於削減3,300名僱員。
本月初高盛新任首席財務官Harvey Schwart表示，削減更多員工可能將有助於向股東提供更高的股本回報率。
去年高盛的股本回報率為10.7%，雖然比2011年有所改善的，但是仍然大大低於金融危機前超過30%的水平。 Schwartz 說他並不認為高盛去年的回報率“從長期看非常理想”。
高盛通常在每年的這個時間段裁撤5%表現最差的僱員。但路透說今年一些部門的裁員幅度可能會更大，尤其是股票交易部門，因為目前其成交量和盈利均十分疲弱。今年迄今為止，高盛對美國主要證券交易所的股票交易量已下降7.2%。
路透消息源稱高盛去年遭受重創的固定收益交易部門，今年交易量有所改善，因此裁員幅度可能會少於5%。
公司發言人David Wells說：
“某些領域中的市場活動已加快，我們仍將把重點放在謹慎管理支出並分配資源上。”他沒有就裁員問題作出回答。
高盛即將展開新一輪裁員表明，雖然華爾街公司顯現出一些復甦跡象，但銀行仍尋求通過削減員工數量來增加獲利能力。
包括摩根士丹利，美國銀行，花旗和瑞信在的華爾街巨頭，在過去幾年裡一直在削減員工隊伍。而與此同時監管收緊則在加大銀行的成本。
高盛在過去兩年以來已經裁員9%，或相當於削減3,300名僱員。
本月初高盛新任首席財務官Harvey Schwart表示，削減更多員工可能將有助於向股東提供更高的股本回報率。
去年高盛的股本回報率為10.7%，雖然比2011年有所改善的，但是仍然大大低於金融危機前超過30%的水平。 Schwartz 說他並不認為高盛去年的回報率“從長期看非常理想”。
對沖基金經理瘋狂做空黃金
黃金對基金經理們的吸引力真的已經消失了嗎？據美國商品期貨交易委員會（CFTC）數據顯示，截至2月19日當週，基金經理們做空黃金額度已經創下了記錄高水平。
CFTC監控的對沖基金經理及其它投資經理們在這短短一周內做空紐交所黃金期貨和期權的合同飆升33%達到6.5617萬份，這也是2006年6月以來，CFTC該項數據的單週最高水平。與此同時，彭博社數據顯示，ETP黃金持倉量已下滑至2536.289噸，創5個月新低；本月已累計下滑2.9%，可能創下自2011年1月以來的最大單月跌幅。此外，本月中旬，SEC公佈的文件顯示，華爾街大佬索羅斯去年第四季度大幅減持了黃金ETF基金持倉，另一位大佬摩爾·培根(Louis Moore Bacon)也減持了黃金。
索羅斯基金管理公司在去年第四季度減持了50%（合60萬股）SPDR黃金信託ETF。而摩爾培根旗下的摩爾資本管理公司也與同期售出了全部SPDR基金並減持了斯普羅特現貨黃金信託基金。
老虎基金創始人Julian Robertson也賣掉了所有Market Vectors Gold Miners ETF持倉，但還保持著Junior Gold Miners ETF的持倉。
而巨頭公司PIMCO也下調了對黃金未來走勢的預期。高盛也稱，黃金價格循環週期可能已經扭轉，因美國經濟集聚動能，且投資者持倉崩盤，因此高盛下調了黃金價格預期。
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