2024年8月1日星期四

PBoC Gold Conduit Revealed—Chinese Central Bank Did Not Stop Buying Gold in May

 Jan Nieuwenhuijs

This article is an analysis of how the Chinese central bank (PBoC) buys gold in London from Western bullion banks. Because the bullion banks take care of the gold transport for the PBoC, the shipments from London to Beijing are disclosed in UK customs data. The customs data reveals that the PBoC continued to buy gold in May—when it communicated to the market it discontinued buying—at a rate of 53 tonnes. The PBoC stated it stopped buying to dampen the gold price so it could acquire more gold. 

Peoples_Bank_of_China_Headquarter_Beijing

People's Bank of China headquarters in Beijing.

Several months ago, I discovered that supply in the Chinese gold market was outstripping demand. During my investigation of this anomaly, I found circumstantial evidence that led me to conclude the surplus is imported in 400-ounce bars from the United Kingdom, and surreptitiously procured by the PBoC. 

Let’s go through some of the mechanics of the global gold market before we can stitch it all together. 

PBoC Gold Buying Hidden in Plain Sight

In global customs data—officially called International Merchandise Trade Statistics (IMTS)—all gold disclosed is “non-monetary,” meaning not owned by a monetary authority such as a central bank. In the United Nations IMTS rulebook it reads that customs data excludes monetary gold: 

Since monetary gold is treated as a financial asset rather than a good, transactions pertaining to it should be excluded from international merchandise trade statistics.

Though, someone familiar with the matter but who prefers to stay anonymous, shared with me that gold import and export data can relate to monetary gold. Commonly, central banks will buy gold from Western bullion banks that arrange transportation and insurance of the metal. The moment these banks ship the gold from the UK it is thus non-monetary bullion, but when it arrives in China it is monetized (changes ownership) and brought to vaults of the central bank, supposedly in Beijing. 

Exports from the UK are mainly from the wholesale gold market in London where virtually all bars traded weigh 400 ounces. The retail market in Britain dealing in smaller bars pales in comparison, and the refining industry in the UK is relatively small. 

In turn, at the core of the Chinese domestic gold market, which excludes Free Trade Zones (FTZs), is the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) where predominantly 1Kg gold bars are traded. 

Picture4

Chart 1. In the entire history of the SGE large 400-ounce bars have hardly ever traded. The most traded product on the SGE is the 1Kg 99.99 fine physical contract. 

The private sector in China trades 1Kg bars through SGE, while the central bank buys “large bars” (400-ounce bars) abroad. As all gold on the SGE is traded in yuan, the PBoC can only diversify its international reserves by buying gold overseas with dollars or other foreign exchange. Aside from logic, there are multiple sources that have made clear the PBoC doesn’t purchase gold on the SGE. For example, the World Gold Council (WGC, page 9), the SGE (page 4), and it was confirmed to me personally by an ex-gold trader from a Chinese state-owned bank. 

The SGE captures the lion share of all gold trading in the Chinese private market. There are rules and incentives that steer most supply—imports, domestic mine production, and recycled metal—towards the SGE, which for liquidity reasons attracts most demand. Hence, the gold withdrawn from the SGE vaults is often used as a proxy for Chinese wholesale demand. In a formula: 

SGE withdrawals = net import + domestic mine output + recycled metal 

Picture5

Chart 2. Apparent Chinese gold supply and demand. 

Before 2022, gold supply and demand in the Chinese market matched. SGE withdrawals were always higher, to varying degrees, than net import plus domestic mine output, the difference being gold recycled through the central bourse. 

If it were true that bullion banks ship gold to China, as non-monetary gold visible in customs data, that doesn’t flow into the SGE system, we would see a discrepancy between apparent Chinese gold supply and SGE withdrawals. As more gold would be supplied to China than sold through the SGE. In a formula:

SGE withdrawals < net import + domestic mine output + recycled metal

Picture2

Chart 3. Starting in 2022 there has been an increase in months wherein net imports alone are higher than SGE withdrawals.

Indeed, both in 2022 and 2023 China’s net import plus mine output transcended SGE withdrawals (let alone if we would add recycled gold). 

Picture6

Chart 4. In 2022 and 2023 apparent supply was higher than demand (SGE withdrawals). 

As we shall see, the surplus in the Chinese gold market—imports that are not sold through the SGE—is being absorbed by the PBoC. 

Readers with deep knowledge of the Chinese gold market might think: “what if the large bars are refined in FTZs and loaded into SGE vaults without being withdrawn?” I checked with a source that has connections to refineries in China, and according to this person the refineries don’t use any large bars as feedstock for producing 1kg bars for the SGE*. Another contact I have, close to the SGE, shared with me that SGE inventory in April 2024 accounted for about 300 tonnes. Inventory had gone up recently together with a rise in the price of gold, this person said. However, the increase in SGE inventory can’t make up for the surplus in the market, which is at least 400 tonnes according to my calculations. 

More Data Supporting the Thesis 

By comparing estimated central bank purchases by the WGC, based on field research, to official statistics regarding gold buying by central banks, we know that since the start of the Ukraine war, in February 2022, monetary authorities in aggregate are secretly buying much more than they report. I have written before that these covert purchases can be attributed for roughly eighty percent to the PBoC. 

Picture3

Chart 5. Total estimated central bank gold buying by the WGC, versus official statistics by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The difference reflects covert acquisitions. 

“Unreported” PBoC gold purchases exploded when $300 billion in foreign exchange reserves from the Russian central bank were frozen by the West early 2022 due to the war. Notably, the UK began exporting 400-ounce bars to China in huge tonnages at the same time. Coincidence? I think not. Ever since, China has taken over gold price control from the West and broke the gold price’s correlation with “real rates” (10-year TIPS yield). 

Picture1

Chart 6. The UK’s direct export to China is likely destined for the PBoC.

Picture8

Chart 7. The US dollar gold price versus the 10-year TIPS yield (real rates). Early 2022 the correlation broke because of, inter alia, massive PBoC purchases. 

The final clue is that there is a relationship between what the Chinese central bank officially reports to be accumulating, and gold exports from the UK to China. What frequently happens, exposed by comparing these numbers, is that the PBoC starts buying gold a few months before it tells the world about it, and severely underreports its additions. This was the case in 2015, 2019, and 2022. 

Picture7

Chart 8. Official data on PBoC gold buying versus UK gold exports to China. Previous exports from the UK for the PBoC were not large enough to create an apparent surplus in the Chinese gold market. 

Conclusion

It all fits and makes sense: the motive, the data, and the anecdotal evidence. Let’s summarize our key findings: 

  • The Chinese central bank desperately needs to diversify its foreign exchange reserves since the beginning of 2022. Since then, the PBoC secretly buys large amounts of gold.
  • At the same time, export of large gold bars from the UK to China explodes. 
  • A “surplus” in the Chinese market appears, while the bullion is not to be found in SGE vaults. As if it has gone up in smoke. 
  • A source indicates that gold shipments for central banks are often included in customs data. 
  • There is a correlation between PBoC official buying and UK exports to China, suggesting the Chinese central bank buys gold in England’s capital and lets banks supervise transport (maybe because the PBoC reaches the limits of its own capacity to ship gold when volumes are sizable). 
  • It all points towards UK gold exports to China are destined for the PBoC—although probably not every ounce of these flows is for the Chinese central bank. Clearly, the PBoC is accumulating more gold than it wants to disclose. 

    When the PBoC stated it had stopped buying gold in May 2024, after continuous purchases for 18 months, I didn’t believe it. The PBoC has few reasons to cease growing its gold reserves in the current geo-political and monetary landscape with a plethora of challenges. 

    ronan manly tweet screenshot

    Click on the image to view the tweet on X.

    Probably, the PBoC wants the most gold for its dollars, so when the price rises fast it will signal it stopped buying, trying to cool the market. In the meantime, the United Kingdom exported 53 tonnes to China in May, of which likely most found its way to Beijing. 

    Note, the PBoC also buys in Switzerland and other countries, flows that can be included or excluded in customs reports, but it’s impossible, from where I stand now, to measure all these separately. 

    Finally, some of my previous analyses have been skewed by the above. Private demand in China has been lower because some (“non-monetary”) imports were taken by the central bank. 

    Notes

    *This person’s intelligence doesn’t mean refineries in Chinese FTZs can’t be refining any 400-ounce bars into smaller ingots. It probably happens, but not on a grand scale.

    2023年12月29日星期五

    World’s lowest cost gold producers in Q3 2023 - report


     https://www.kitco.com/news/article/2023-12-22/worlds-lowest-cost-gold-producers-q3-2023-report


    Kitco News) – Centerra Gold was the lowest cost gold producer in Q3 2023 (among 100koz+/quarter producers) measured by all-in sustaining cost metric, followed by Lundin Gold and Perseus Mining. The average AISC reported by lowest cost producers increased by 3% y-o-y, largely due to inflationary pressures.

    The following is the list of the top 10 lowest cost gold mining companies in Q3 2023. We looked only at companies that produced more than 100,000 ounces of gold in Q3 2023 and reported all-in sustaining cost (AISC) metric, which serves as an internationally recognized benchmark for operating efficiency. AISC is in USD.

    1. Centerra Gold (TSX:CG) (NYSE:CGAU). $827/oz. The company’s AISC on a by-product basis was $827 per ounce in Q3 2023, down 12% compared to $941 per ounce in Q3 2022. According to Centerra, the decrease in AISC on a by-product basis was primarily due to lower gold production costs per ounce and lower corporate general administrative costs. This was partially offset by lower by-product credits as a result of lower copper pounds sold and higher sustaining capital expenditures at the Mount Milligan mine and the Öksüt mine.

    2. Lundin Gold (TSX:LUG) (OTCQX:LUGDF). $907/oz. Ecuador-focused gold producer Lundin Gold reported AISC of $907 per oz of gold sold in Q3 2023, up 12% compared to Q3 2022, primarily because of lower gold production due to expected lower grade and recoveries, as well as an increase in sustaining capital activities during the quarter.

    3. Perseus Mining (ASX:PRU) (TSX:PRU). $937/oz. Africa-focused gold producer Perseus Mining reported AISC of $937/oz in Q3 2023, which is an increase of 7% from Q3 2022 ($879/oz).

    4. Endeavour Mining (LSE:EDV) (TSX:EDV) (OTCQX:EDVMF). $967/oz. Endeavour Mining, the largest gold producer in West Africa, reported AISC from continuing operations of $967/oz in Q3 2023, an increase of 13% over Q3 2022, due to higher costs across all the company’s continuing operations.

    5. Evolution Mining (ASX:EVN). $1,056/oz. Australia’s Evolution Mining reported AISC of $1,056/oz in Q3 2023, up 2% compared to AISC of $1,034/oz in Q3 2022.

    6. Alamos Gold (TSX:AGI) (NYSE:AGI). $1,121/oz. The company’s Q3 2023 AISC of $1,121 per ounce was 5% lower than the prior year period driven by the low-cost production growth from La Yaqui Grande.

    7. Agnico Eagle (NYSE:AEM) (TSX:AEM). $1,210/oz. The company’s AISC increased by 9% when compared to the prior-year period primarily due to higher minesite costs per tonne resulting from inflation.

    8. Barrick (NYSE:GOLD) (TSX:ABX). $1,255/oz. Barrick’s AISC was 1% lower than the prior year quarter, mainly due to the impact of the sales mix across the portfolio, with a higher contribution of ounces at a lower cost per ounce from Cortez, Turquoise Ridge and Kibali, combined with lower unit costs at Carlin and lower minesite sustaining capital expenditures on a per ounce basis.

    9. Eldorado Gold (TSX:ELD) (NYSE:EGO). $1,259/oz. Eldorado Gold’s AISC increased by 11% y-o-y to $1,259/oz in Q3 2023, primarily due to lower production at Kisladag and price increases for certain commodities and consumables.

    10. Kinross (TSX: K) (NYSE: KGC). $1,264/oz. In Q3 2023, the company’s AISC from continuing operations per Au oz. sold on a by-product basis was $1,264, compared with $1,269 in Q3 2022. Kinross noted the ramp-up of production at La Coipa, which continued to be the company’s lowest cost operation in Q3 2023.

    Lowest cost gold producers in Q3 2023






    2023年6月7日星期三

    黄金季度大行程初確立|突破快到|六月將現入市良機|利率失速或推動金價創新高



     

    筆者大忙,兩個多月沒寫分析,大家別來無恙吧!金銀是筆者的主要分析對象,上篇黄金分析是年初的《金價技術轉勢……今明兩季是關鍵》,半年過去,走勢跟筆者的分析大致吻合,金價極可能正以季度上升之勢展開大行程。

    這個大行程與馬田(Martin Armstrong)的經濟信心模式(ECM)一脈相承,筆者曾在2020年7月寫過一篇《私人信心波發力……小心2022年3月出現調整》,指出黄金的上升關鍵在循環逆轉(Cycle Inversion),即私人信心波起落過程中,金價不跟隨信心波下滑而下跌,反而逆向上升,就會累積動能,於拐點後的下個波段中大升。

    當下我們剛好經歷了兩次循環逆轉,第一次是較長期的4.3年循環逆轉,亦即是2015.75至2020.05,金價從$1119升至$1572,這次循環逆轉的動能將金價推上$2000以上,於2020年8月初創出$2089歷史新高。第二次最近才發生,是4.3年循環中的小循環,即2022.2至2023.275,金價從$1910升至$2003,筆者相信金價已經在循環逆轉中累積了動能,將以大行程姿態升向2024.35,甚至超越這個日子,於2024.85創出一個歷史高位(詳見2021年5月12日《拐點轉勢明顯……黄金牛市將運行至2024年第四季》)。

    馬田在4月10日《The ECM Turning Point This Week》指出,資產市場通常會測試兩次以上高位阻力,才會正式突破,配合黄金月度時機佈陣,他預計金價4月10日的ECM拐點再次挑戰歷史高位後會回調至6月,然後會第四度挑戰歷史新高,並正式突破。這段時間剛好是俄羅斯31.4年政治歷史循環的重大拐點(5月20/21日),金價的突破很可能與地緣政治變化有關。馬田寫此篇分析時,俄烏戰事陷入膠着狀態,走向未明。

    ECM再次顯現神奇預測力!執筆時,筆者從多方新聞得知,俄羅斯瓦格納集團(Wagner Group)正式攻陷烏東要塞巴赫穆特(Bachmut),俄總統普京發出賀電,時間剛好是5月20日。這小填有多條公路、鐵路通向烏克蘭多個城市,西面又是無險可守的東歐平原,俄軍可兵分多路,長驅直入,意味着歐美在這場「西方內戰」的重大失利,將進一步打擊人們對歐美政府的信心。

     



     

    除了地緣政治因素,更關鍵是利率因素!過去一年多,經過美聯儲十多次加息,目前美國息口已經升至2008年金融海嘯爆發前水平,但通脹仍然處於1983年以來的高位,與此同時經濟危機卻亦步亦趨。高息導至美債價格急挫,許多金融機構持有的美債資產大幅萎縮,形成資不抵債,矽谷銀行、瑞信、第一共和銀行相繼在危機中倒下,歐美銀行危機愈演愈烈,至執筆仍未完結。多項經濟數據已顯示美國經濟正步向衰退,例如全美房價從2022年7月至2023年1月已連挫七個月。美國利率何去何從?美國政府已經陷入兩難,暫停加息可能令通脹重燃,再加息可能觸發更大規模的危機。

    2022年3月加息周期展開後,市場看淡金價,黄金經歷了罕見的七個月連挫,卻在2022年11月止跌回升,從$1618低位升至執筆時約$1970,將加息以來的下跌幅度全數收復,加息不利黄金的說法再度無法確立,或者說,加息不利黄金只在某種特定條件下才能成立。

    筆者留意到,從2022年11月至今的黄金升勢中,有兩處特別明顯的升勢,第一是美國中期選舉那個星期,共和黨取得了眾議院控制權後,金價一周內升超過100美元;第二是矽谷銀行爆雷後那星期,同樣升超過100美元。利率高企下,金價仍能如此上漲,筆者覺得或許市場已經無法預計息口的走勢,利率政策正走向失速,情況有點像1970年代。

     


     

     

    通脹升温下,1972年3月美聯儲開啟了加息周期,超初壓不住金價,金息同升,但到了1973年7月,當息口暴加1.75%,至10.25%,金價隨即大挫近20%。不過,到了1974年2月,因為經濟衰退,美聯儲逼於形勢,突然將利率大降2%,市場對利率前景無所適從,短短一個月,就將金價從$130推升至$180美元,隨後又因通脹升温,再度提高利率,然後到1974年底又因衰退加劇,一口氣把息口大降4.75%,利率就像過山車一樣,短時間內忽然大升,忽然大降,金價以一浪高於一浪方式,升至接近$200美元。

    這段歷史告訴我們,最有利金價的利率政策不是加息或減息,而是突如其來的利率失速,市場無法為政府的利率政策作部署,當下情況似乎已經愈來愈接近這種失速。

     

     

    原文連結:

    https://www.goldbuginvest.com/goldbuginvest/gold-price-ecm-cycle-inversion/ 

     

    2023年1月15日星期日

    蜂巢,蜂蜜金! Vitreum 內填琺瑯錶盤(Champlevè Enamel Dial )

     


    當他們第一次推出時,我們大多數人都沒有聽說過 Vitreum 手錶。 但令我感興趣的是他們限量生產的帶有蜂窩圖案的琺瑯錶盤。

     

     

    Vitreum 總部位於丹麥 Randers,由 Kasper Reisner 創立,他們限量推出了兩種版本的 Champlevé 琺瑯錶盤 - Starry NightHoneycomb 是星夜還是蜂巢? 艱難的選擇,但我選擇了 Honeycomb。

    手動上鍊FH01是首次推出號型。 琺瑯錶盤在威爾士製造,但手表組裝在丹麥完成。

     

    這枚機械時計配有大明火琺瑯錶盤,蜂窩表採用內填工藝。 這意味著 Champlevè 錶盤中的六角形單元,首先在一塊純銀中由經驗雕刻師,雕刻成型,之後每個六角形單元都經過雕刻師手工雕刻,形成微型太陽放射圖案。 然後將蜂蜜色玻璃琺瑯(生琺瑯)小心地填入凹槽(在本例中為蜂窩狀),然後在 850°C 下燒製,製成大明火琺瑯錶盤。

     

    與任何手工製作的產品一樣,沒有兩件作品是相同的。 相似但從不相同。 手工製作的琺瑯作品,每一次分層、燒製、拋光都會帶來不同的效果。 即使在蜂窩的六角形單元之間,您也可以看到差異,保證它是手工製作,而不是商業製作——在現今商業社會,不確定您是否真的可以像這樣製作商業模式的琺瑯錶盤。

     
     
    而手工製作的琺瑯錶盤,難免會有瑕疵。 因為它們是手工製作,所以沒有兩個錶盤是一樣,因為每個錶盤都有不同的顏色配置。 當購買 Vitreum Honeycomb 時,收藏家將獲得一件獨特的作品。 

    製作這面盤,從原材料開始,直至面盤完成,並由金雕師與琺瑯師,人手製作,大約需時7天


    製作錶盤的是一位藝術家。所以這枚手錶,可以稱得上是最接近"手腕上的藝術"



     

    FH01 每種款式限量發售 5 件。在眾多潛在購買者中,隨機抽出5位客戶, 據我了解,這可能不是唯一的 Honeycomb Vitreum。 好像也會有未來的版本。 以什麼形式和形狀,我不知道。 

    整體包裝是一個引人注目的包裝。 時,分秒針都做的很好。。。

    至於表帶方面,我配上了 日本INDEN:印傳 Urushi, INDEN 部分採用日本鹿皮與手工塗漆漆製成。 在戰國時期(1467-1603 年)作為武士盔甲的一部分流行,這種具有數百年曆史的技術現在被用於製作可能是當今最獨特的錶帶之一。 INDEN 漆皮具有漆漆的獨特特性 - 隨著時間的推移變得更有光澤並呈現出輕微的銅綠。 製作和固化 INDEN 非常耗時,每年只能製作有限數量的板材。 鹿皮以可持續方式從日本西部的官方當地飼養員處採購,數量非常有限。

     

     

     
     
    機芯的是手動上弦的Sellita SW210機芯。而我手上的這個版本,刻有Kasper Reisner的簽名,所以,我得到了一個獨一無二的版本。
       
    還有一個漂亮的細節……在背面近把的裡有一個凹槽。 拔出表冠就容易多了。



    錶殼兩側的拉絲拋光和亮化處理。絕對是用心之作,據我所知,此錶殼的設計靈感來自lange & söhne。

     

    一路上有許多挑戰,但 Vitreum 團隊已經完成了非常獨特的產品。 祝賀 Kasper 和 Vitreum 團隊。 迫不及待地想看看接下來會出現什麼。

    關於商標和品牌




    和Kasper 了解之後,原來這商標後的含義是,

    “這是在瑞典北部青銅時代早期岩畫上發現的一個古老圖案。 這是一個騎馬的人(也許是去打仗?)對我來說,這象徵著不斷前進,進行必要的戰鬥以克服逆境。 這也是對過去的致敬。

    它曾經是我父親的公司標誌。 他去世大約 15 年後,我決定要復興。”
    Kasper 父親是從事考古工作。


    品牌名字Vitreous 它是玻璃的拉丁語。  Vitreous enamel是指玻璃搪瓷

     


     




    內填琺瑯champleve又稱為「雕刻琺瑯」,顧名思義,就是一種結合金雕的琺瑯工法,金雕師與琺瑯師雙方都必須付出高度的創造力,密切合作才能完成作品。首先金雕師依據草稿在金屬胎上鑿刻出輪廓,接下來琺瑯師會在雕鑿的凹槽內填入琺瑯彩,再以攝氏800度以上的高溫進行燒結,這個工序重複幾次使色彩臻於完美後,再將琺瑯表面打磨至平整,最後再燒製上一層亮彩。而工藝的重點在於金雕師必須預想成品的效果,才能刻出明晰的輪廓邊緣,使最終成品的雕紋更自然地顯現。

     


    透明琺瑯Flinqué工藝是先在金屬胎上雕刻出紐索紋或是其他花紋,接著在雕刻好的金屬胎上塗覆透明琺瑯再送入電爐內燒結。與其他琺瑯工藝一樣,因為一次塗上過厚的釉彩可能會在燒結過程中裂開,因此必須反覆數次上釉與燒結的程序,一層一層燒結以達到需要的厚度,最後一次燒結完成後再進行一次打磨拋光,使成品表面光亮。完成的成品可以同時欣賞到溫潤的琺瑯,以及其下細膩的金屬刻紋。



    在金屬胎上雕刻出紐索紋或是其他花紋,接著在雕刻好的胎上塗覆透明琺瑯。







     

     

     

    Honeycomb, Honeygold! Vitreum Champlevè Enamel Dial

     

    When they first launched, most of us have not heard of Vitreum Watches. But what intrigued me was their limited production of an enamel dial with Honeycomb motif.

     

     

    Based in Randers, Denmark and founded by Kasper Reisner the folks at Vitreum launched in limited quantities two versions of the Champlevé enamelled dial - the Starry Night and Honeycomb. Was it Starry Night or Honeycomb? Tough choices but I settled for the Honeycomb.

    The hand wound FH01 launched the brand. The enamel dials are made in Wales but the timepiece assembly is done in Denmark. 

     


     These mechanical timepieces come with a Grand Feu Enamel dial and for the Honeycomb, uses the Champlevé technique. What that means is that the cells in the Champlevè dial are first shaped in a solid piece of silver, after which each cell is engraved by hand creating the miniature sunbust pattern. Then honey-coloured vitreous enamel (raw enamel) is carefully filled into the recess (in this case the honeycomb) and then fired at 850°C to achieve the grand feu enamel dial. 

     


     As with any hand crafted products, no two are alike. Similar but never the same. With hand crafted enamel work each layering, firing, polishing will bring different results. Even between cells of the honeycomb, you can see differences guaranteeing that its hand crafted and not commercially done - not sure if you can actually do commercial enamel dials like these. 

     


     

     And with hand made enamel dials, there are bound to be imperfections. Because they are hand made, no two dials are alike as each dial will have a different colour configuration. When one buys the Vitreum Honeycomb, they will get a unique piece. 

     


     The FH01 is released in a a limited quantity of 5 per variant. As I understand it, this might not be the only Honeycomb Vitreum might do. Seems like there will be future releases too. In what form and shape, I don't know. 

    The overall package is a compelling one. Even the hands are pretty well made too...  

    As for the strap, I matched it with the Japanese INDEN: Inden Urushi,

    The INDEN portion of the strap is created from combining Japanese deer leather with hand-applied urushi lacquer. Popular during the Sengoku period (1467-1603) as part of samurai armorware, this centuries-old technique is now applied to create what is perhaps one of the most unique watch straps today. The INDEN Urushi leather features the unique properties of urushi lacquer - becoming glossier and achieving a slight patina over time. It is extremely time-consuming to create and cure INDEN and only a limited number of sheets can be made each year. The deer leather is sustainably sourced from official local breeders in the western Japan, and is very limited. 

     

    Beating inside is a hand wound Sellita SW210 movement.This version in my hand is engraved  signature with Kasper Reisner , so I got a unique one.

    And a nifty detail... there is a recess in the case. Pulling out the crown is that much easier. 


    The brushed polishing and lightening on both sides of the case. 

     

    Many challenges along the way, but the folks at Vitreum have come through with a very unique product. Congratulations to Kasper and the Vitreum team. Can't wait to see what's next in the line up.