http://hk.news.yahoo.com/article/110606/4/op8s.html
工聯會 表示，在過去近2年，接獲25名市民求助，懷疑買賣倫敦 金受騙，金額達230萬元。
工聯會表示，部分事主透過免費購座認識經紀，被遊說開設戶口，但經紀沒有詳細解釋風險及交易程序。
事主開設戶口後，經紀在短時間內為事主進行大量交易，賺取佣金，而事主就不斷虧蝕。
工聯會表示，由於中介公司及經紀，並非本港交易場成員，事主無法申訴。工聯會促請政府設立完善機制規管倫敦金交易。
2011年6月6日星期一
嚇人舉動無礙黃金牛市
請讀者先看看幾個金價的基本數字：
上周末金市以1542.4元（美元．下同）收市，這是歷來第二高的每周收市價，同時也是歷來第三高的每日收市價。
今年以來，倫敦金下午定盤的每月平均價繼續保持逐月爬升之勢─1月份為1356.40元、2月份為1372.72元、3月份為1424.01元、4月份為1473.81元，而5月份雖曾受打壓但仍創出1510.44元的歷來最高每月平均價。
從上述數字可以看出，黃金牛市事實上仍在進行中，目前金價處在略低於歷史高峰的水平。因此那些在今年首季去沽清黃金資產的舉措顯然是不值得稱道的，而利用這些「沽金故事」來嚇人的當局肯定是別有用心，但它只能一時得逞而不能永久得逞，因為此舉是逆勢的反動。
美元復跌金價復升
敝欄多次提到，美國當局5月初的一系列行動是為了挽救美元，但目標不全在美元滙價本身，而旨在削弱世人對美元之快將崩潰的預期，打壓金銀價格是其中一個手段。
美滙指數（USDX）在4月底曾跌至72.95，看似仍高於2008年的低點71.79，但其實廣闊美滙指數（TWEXB）當時報94.05，已跌破了三年前的低點94.78，美元很可能出現一次技術性崩跌，世人對美元崩潰的預期將會極大地加強。
為了不讓這些事情發生，美國當局便要採取挽救美元的行動，而稍後發生的歐洲國家主權債務危機惡化又間接地幫了它一把，美滙指數在5月下旬回升至76.16，廣闊美滙指數亦回揚至96.49。
然 而，美國當局正在濫發美鈔，美元滙價根本不可能真正強起來。截至6月1日美國貨幣基礎又增至26253.09億元的歷來新高，即是說自去年11月以來的 QE2期間，美國銀行體系內再多增了6471.58億元美鈔，此數量比聯儲局前聲稱的6000億元規模更大。故無怪美滙指數回揚到上文說的高點就碰到中長 線下降軌的阻力，到上周末更因美國就業數據相當差勁而進一步回落到74.13，回復到接近4月底時的低水平，金價亦回揚至接近當時的高水平。
「再膨脹」政策將繼續
在QE2快將完結的前夕，金融市場似乎以緊縮的姿態向聯邦儲備局祈求有更多的寬鬆政策，美股軟落，十年期債券孳息跌至3厘水平之下。新公布的就業數據更顯示，美國經濟會在一個頗長時間內表現低迷、乏力復蘇。
市場估計聯儲局即使不推出QE3，也會長時間保持超低利率和採取其他刺激經濟的措施。敝欄一直認為，聯儲局只能繼續採取「再膨脹」（reflation）政策，不管叫「QE」或別的什麼名堂，而這類政策是有利金價的。
當下所見投機基金已開始重投金市，截至上周二他們的淨好倉量比前一周增升了1.93萬張合約。但是銀市早前受的打擊依然影響金市，到使COMEX期金市的未平倉合約總量徘徊在50萬張上下水平，內部動能仍較弱。
此 外，目前金市是處於反彈後再向下找尋支持的階段，故估計市勢暫時仍維持上落市狀態，只是低位有可能不致低於1486元，並可望維持在1504元之上，短期 支持甚至已上移至1514元和1526元的水平。1551元仍是當前的阻力，而最後的阻力是在1564元，升越此位金市可望挑戰新高。
銀市有所不同，ETF的持銀量和COEMX的未平倉合約量仍在萎縮中，39.5元銀價仍是回升阻力。但鑑於上文論述的利好因素，估計銀市可望在33元之上得到新支持，而短期支持可上移至34.2元和35.1元。正面影響力會來自金市。
5月份金市的故事告訴我們：要努力做一個有獨立思考能力的人，不要參與人嚇人！
上周末金市以1542.4元（美元．下同）收市，這是歷來第二高的每周收市價，同時也是歷來第三高的每日收市價。
今年以來，倫敦金下午定盤的每月平均價繼續保持逐月爬升之勢─1月份為1356.40元、2月份為1372.72元、3月份為1424.01元、4月份為1473.81元，而5月份雖曾受打壓但仍創出1510.44元的歷來最高每月平均價。
從上述數字可以看出，黃金牛市事實上仍在進行中，目前金價處在略低於歷史高峰的水平。因此那些在今年首季去沽清黃金資產的舉措顯然是不值得稱道的，而利用這些「沽金故事」來嚇人的當局肯定是別有用心，但它只能一時得逞而不能永久得逞，因為此舉是逆勢的反動。
美元復跌金價復升
敝欄多次提到，美國當局5月初的一系列行動是為了挽救美元，但目標不全在美元滙價本身，而旨在削弱世人對美元之快將崩潰的預期，打壓金銀價格是其中一個手段。
美滙指數（USDX）在4月底曾跌至72.95，看似仍高於2008年的低點71.79，但其實廣闊美滙指數（TWEXB）當時報94.05，已跌破了三年前的低點94.78，美元很可能出現一次技術性崩跌，世人對美元崩潰的預期將會極大地加強。
為了不讓這些事情發生，美國當局便要採取挽救美元的行動，而稍後發生的歐洲國家主權債務危機惡化又間接地幫了它一把，美滙指數在5月下旬回升至76.16，廣闊美滙指數亦回揚至96.49。
然 而，美國當局正在濫發美鈔，美元滙價根本不可能真正強起來。截至6月1日美國貨幣基礎又增至26253.09億元的歷來新高，即是說自去年11月以來的 QE2期間，美國銀行體系內再多增了6471.58億元美鈔，此數量比聯儲局前聲稱的6000億元規模更大。故無怪美滙指數回揚到上文說的高點就碰到中長 線下降軌的阻力，到上周末更因美國就業數據相當差勁而進一步回落到74.13，回復到接近4月底時的低水平，金價亦回揚至接近當時的高水平。
「再膨脹」政策將繼續
在QE2快將完結的前夕，金融市場似乎以緊縮的姿態向聯邦儲備局祈求有更多的寬鬆政策，美股軟落，十年期債券孳息跌至3厘水平之下。新公布的就業數據更顯示，美國經濟會在一個頗長時間內表現低迷、乏力復蘇。
市場估計聯儲局即使不推出QE3，也會長時間保持超低利率和採取其他刺激經濟的措施。敝欄一直認為，聯儲局只能繼續採取「再膨脹」（reflation）政策，不管叫「QE」或別的什麼名堂，而這類政策是有利金價的。
當下所見投機基金已開始重投金市，截至上周二他們的淨好倉量比前一周增升了1.93萬張合約。但是銀市早前受的打擊依然影響金市，到使COMEX期金市的未平倉合約總量徘徊在50萬張上下水平，內部動能仍較弱。
此 外，目前金市是處於反彈後再向下找尋支持的階段，故估計市勢暫時仍維持上落市狀態，只是低位有可能不致低於1486元，並可望維持在1504元之上，短期 支持甚至已上移至1514元和1526元的水平。1551元仍是當前的阻力，而最後的阻力是在1564元，升越此位金市可望挑戰新高。
銀市有所不同，ETF的持銀量和COEMX的未平倉合約量仍在萎縮中，39.5元銀價仍是回升阻力。但鑑於上文論述的利好因素，估計銀市可望在33元之上得到新支持，而短期支持可上移至34.2元和35.1元。正面影響力會來自金市。
5月份金市的故事告訴我們：要努力做一個有獨立思考能力的人，不要參與人嚇人！
黃金作抵押品需求上升
黃 金成為近年投資的焦點，近期來自歐洲方面的相關消息，更引起市場關注。世界黃金協會上周表示，歐洲議會經濟和貨幣事務委員會同意允許結算所，按照《歐洲市 場基礎作業監理改革提案》的規定，接受黃金作為抵押品，而有關提議會被提交至歐洲議會及歐盟理事會，並會在7月進行新一輪投票。 有分析認為這決定反映黃金作為替代貨幣的吸引力，另外，若果黃金可被允許作為抵押品進行貸款的話，即歐元區承認了黃金作為交易所和商業銀行的核心資本。  黃金作抵押品的需求不斷上升。（資料圖片） 事實上，去年歐洲主要的衍生產品結算所ICE Clear Europe成為歐洲首家接受黃金作抵押品的結算所。今年2月，摩根大通更成為首家接受黃金作為抵押品的銀行。另外，芝加哥商品交易所已接受黃金作為特定 交易的抵押品。至於倫敦結算所方面更表示，計劃於今年稍後開始接受黃金作抵押品。 世界黃金協會就認為，來自20國集團的監管者要求場外交易在交易所進行結算，加上全球經濟前景存在風險，導致其他形式抵押品的信譽受損，預期結算所、交易所和商業銀行將黃金作抵押品的需求會不斷上升。 http://app3.rthk.org.hk/rthk/news/blog/detail.php?aid=756 |
宋鴻兵的微博 5-6-2011
CNBC:61%的美國人相信生活水平很難恢復到這次危機前的狀態,更有10%的人說美國經濟永遠不可能回到從前了。 63%的人對目前的經濟“感覺不好”或者“很糟糕”，在2010年時只有49%的人這樣想。調查還顯示美國人現在都不願花錢，將大宗消費的計劃推遲12個月以上，這大宗消費包括買房子，買汽車或者渡假
2011年6月5日星期日
Fed Lawyer Alvarez: “The Federal Reserve Does NOT Own Any Gold at All”
http://goldnews.com/2011/06/02/fed-lawyer-alvarez-the-federal-reserve-does-not-own-any-gold-at-all/
Thats right. The Fed owns NO gold. Zero, zip, ziltch.
For those of you who did not watch yesterday’s monetary policy hearing in the house of representatives, you most likely missed this bombshell exchange between Federal Reserve lawyer Scott Alvarez and committee chairman Dr. Ron Paul. My jaw literally dropped when I heard the Fed’s general counsel declare that the Federal Reserve owns no gold. After 1934, Alvarez explains that the Fed handed its gold over to the Treasury in exchange for gold certificates. When pressed further, Alvarez noted that the gold certificates do not represent any interest whatsoever in the gold itself. He explained the gold certificate listings on the Fed balance sheet, not as a claim to gold, but at most a claim to dollars from the Treasury. See the quotes here (and watch the videos at the bottom of the post):
Scott Alvarez: “The Federal Reserve does not own any gold at all… we have not owned gold since 1934, um, so we have not engaged in any gold swap. Before 1934 the Federal Reserve did, we did own gold. We turned that over by law to the Treasury and received in return for that gold certificates.”
Ron Paul: “…You have the securities for essentially all the gold?”
Scott Alvarez: “No. No we have no interest in the gold that is owned by the Treasury. We have simply an accounting document that is called gold certificates that represents the value at a statutory rate that we gave to the Treasury in 1934″
This issue is even more complicated than may appear and after doing some research we seem to have settled some of the quirks in this odd Treasury-Fed scheme. Bare with us when reading through this.
What appears to have happened under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 is the Treasury seized the Fed’s gold, taking full ownership and claim to its proceeds. The Treasury as an aside transferred a sum of special 1934 series gold certificates to the Fed amounting to the statutory value of gold ($20.67 per ounce) times the quantity of gold transfered from the Fed to the Treasury. The official gold price was later revalued to $35 an ounce, an effective devaluation of the currency, but the quantity of gold certificates issued to the Fed was not amended to reflect revaluation until the passing of the Par Value Modification Act of 1972. Under this act, gold was revalued again, this time to $38 an oz, and the Fed’s gold certificate account was credited upwards by $822 million worth of certificates to reflect the change in the gold price from $35 to $38. The gold was revalued one last time in 1973 to $42.22 and again the Federal Reserve was credited with more gold certificates, $1.157 billion to be exact, to account for this. After everything, the Federal Reserve was left with $11.16 billion dollars worth of gold certificates.
So what exactly are the gold certificates the Fed holds? For one, the Fed’s gold certificates are unlike previous gold certificate issues, and are not publicly trade-able. They are also not direct claims to gold, but rather reflect claims only to US issued currency or coin held by the Treasury. The Fed can take claim to this currency on demand, and their certificates are an accounted for liability of the Treasury as listed in Note 19. Treasury’s “Other Liabilities”. In addition, if the Treasury is unable to satisfy a demand by the Fed for the funds, the Fed is able to gain access to the gold, since the gold stands as collateral for the gold certificates issued by the Treasury. This fact is taken from this statement in Note 2, from the Treasury’s balance sheet:
“Gold totaling $11.1 billion as of September 30, 2010, and 2009, was pledged as collateral for gold certificates issued and authorized to the FRBs by the Secretary of the Treasury.“
Given that the Fed has an indirect claim to the Treasury’s gold, it is questionable what line of reasoning the Fed’s general counsel was using when stating so broadly that the Fed has “no interest in the gold that is owned by the treasury”.
In any case, we can analyze the implications of the basic facts and come to a couple of conclusions:
1) The widespread notion that the Fed owns gold is false. The corollary to this is the mistaken belief that the Fed understates its gold holdings on its balance sheet by only reporting certificates based on the $42.22 statutory gold value. The Fed does not in fact own the US gold stock multiplied by the market price of gold, unless the Treasury defaults and even then its not clear. The Fed does, however, own a claim to currency totaling $11.1 billion and this value has a remote chance of going up significantly if the Treasury revalues its gold and maintains the practice initiated in the Par Value Modification Act.
2) The fact that the Fed owns no gold, nor claims to any gold, means the fundamental value of the dollar lacks any backing besides dollars themselves, not including Fed building and equipment. Dollars are in essence worth a lot less than many people thought, and the Fed is much more impotent in using the prowess of their assets, and conducting monetary policy in general, than many believed. In all, Alvarez’s clarification strengthens the case for gold’s high dollar value immensely.
see the specific exchange between Alvarez and Ron Paul about the Fed’s gold here:
watch the whole hearing here:
Thats right. The Fed owns NO gold. Zero, zip, ziltch.
For those of you who did not watch yesterday’s monetary policy hearing in the house of representatives, you most likely missed this bombshell exchange between Federal Reserve lawyer Scott Alvarez and committee chairman Dr. Ron Paul. My jaw literally dropped when I heard the Fed’s general counsel declare that the Federal Reserve owns no gold. After 1934, Alvarez explains that the Fed handed its gold over to the Treasury in exchange for gold certificates. When pressed further, Alvarez noted that the gold certificates do not represent any interest whatsoever in the gold itself. He explained the gold certificate listings on the Fed balance sheet, not as a claim to gold, but at most a claim to dollars from the Treasury. See the quotes here (and watch the videos at the bottom of the post):
Scott Alvarez: “The Federal Reserve does not own any gold at all… we have not owned gold since 1934, um, so we have not engaged in any gold swap. Before 1934 the Federal Reserve did, we did own gold. We turned that over by law to the Treasury and received in return for that gold certificates.”
Ron Paul: “…You have the securities for essentially all the gold?”
Scott Alvarez: “No. No we have no interest in the gold that is owned by the Treasury. We have simply an accounting document that is called gold certificates that represents the value at a statutory rate that we gave to the Treasury in 1934″
This issue is even more complicated than may appear and after doing some research we seem to have settled some of the quirks in this odd Treasury-Fed scheme. Bare with us when reading through this.
What appears to have happened under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 is the Treasury seized the Fed’s gold, taking full ownership and claim to its proceeds. The Treasury as an aside transferred a sum of special 1934 series gold certificates to the Fed amounting to the statutory value of gold ($20.67 per ounce) times the quantity of gold transfered from the Fed to the Treasury. The official gold price was later revalued to $35 an ounce, an effective devaluation of the currency, but the quantity of gold certificates issued to the Fed was not amended to reflect revaluation until the passing of the Par Value Modification Act of 1972. Under this act, gold was revalued again, this time to $38 an oz, and the Fed’s gold certificate account was credited upwards by $822 million worth of certificates to reflect the change in the gold price from $35 to $38. The gold was revalued one last time in 1973 to $42.22 and again the Federal Reserve was credited with more gold certificates, $1.157 billion to be exact, to account for this. After everything, the Federal Reserve was left with $11.16 billion dollars worth of gold certificates.
So what exactly are the gold certificates the Fed holds? For one, the Fed’s gold certificates are unlike previous gold certificate issues, and are not publicly trade-able. They are also not direct claims to gold, but rather reflect claims only to US issued currency or coin held by the Treasury. The Fed can take claim to this currency on demand, and their certificates are an accounted for liability of the Treasury as listed in Note 19. Treasury’s “Other Liabilities”. In addition, if the Treasury is unable to satisfy a demand by the Fed for the funds, the Fed is able to gain access to the gold, since the gold stands as collateral for the gold certificates issued by the Treasury. This fact is taken from this statement in Note 2, from the Treasury’s balance sheet:
“Gold totaling $11.1 billion as of September 30, 2010, and 2009, was pledged as collateral for gold certificates issued and authorized to the FRBs by the Secretary of the Treasury.“
Given that the Fed has an indirect claim to the Treasury’s gold, it is questionable what line of reasoning the Fed’s general counsel was using when stating so broadly that the Fed has “no interest in the gold that is owned by the treasury”.
In any case, we can analyze the implications of the basic facts and come to a couple of conclusions:
1) The widespread notion that the Fed owns gold is false. The corollary to this is the mistaken belief that the Fed understates its gold holdings on its balance sheet by only reporting certificates based on the $42.22 statutory gold value. The Fed does not in fact own the US gold stock multiplied by the market price of gold, unless the Treasury defaults and even then its not clear. The Fed does, however, own a claim to currency totaling $11.1 billion and this value has a remote chance of going up significantly if the Treasury revalues its gold and maintains the practice initiated in the Par Value Modification Act.
2) The fact that the Fed owns no gold, nor claims to any gold, means the fundamental value of the dollar lacks any backing besides dollars themselves, not including Fed building and equipment. Dollars are in essence worth a lot less than many people thought, and the Fed is much more impotent in using the prowess of their assets, and conducting monetary policy in general, than many believed. In all, Alvarez’s clarification strengthens the case for gold’s high dollar value immensely.
see the specific exchange between Alvarez and Ron Paul about the Fed’s gold here:
watch the whole hearing here:
復甦弱 QE3事在必行
| 史理生：復甦弱 QE3事在必行 【00:02】2011年06月05日 | |
【on.cc 專訊】東方產經「國際金融視野」專欄作者史理生：全球金融危機迄今已逾三年，美國經濟復甦仍步履蹣跚。與以往歷次衰退後的復甦相比，美國這次反彈力度屬最 低。房地產調整是次按危機的直接成因，而目前美國房價仍未止跌，自2007年以來斷供個案不斷上升，現時仍沒有改善跡象。 在經濟、就業難有改善 下，房地產調整有進一步加深趨勢。房地產對美國經濟到底有多大影響？首先房地產是美國經濟支柱，其總市值是GDP的兩倍；其次房地產及其相關活動佔GDP 的27%；房屋貸款達14萬億美元，佔銀行總貸款比重三分之一。可以說，如沒有房地產配合，經濟復甦只屬癡人說夢。 美國從政府到個人負債累積至危險程度。布殊時代，國債從5.7萬億美元累積至逾10萬億美元。金融海嘯後，財赤已逾14萬億美元。正如波士頓大學授Laurence Kotlikoff所言，美國實際上正邁向破產。 美國消費主義盛行，多年來一直依賴擴張信貸和提前消費推動經濟增長。在經歷金融危機打擊後，美國勢必逐步收縮金融等虛擬經濟領域，重新重視實體經濟，擴大對實體經濟方面的投資。 然而，重建產業結構，說易行難，不僅需大量、長期的投資和建設，更需對現行結構和體系進行艱巨的調整和改革，兩者非一時三刻便有成效。這也是目前失業率居高不下，就業難望改善的原因。 美 國目前的貨幣環境為聯儲局有史以來最寬鬆，為拯救風雨飄搖的市場和嚴重衰退的經濟，聯儲局於2008年底開始維持超低利率，而且還罕有地推出兩輪量化寬鬆 措施。但實行這些史無前例的政策並非沒有風險，其代價有可能就是日後報復性的資產價格泡沫，和被視為洪水猛獸的惡性通脹。 正因在上述結構因素的制 約下，美國經濟積弱趨勢短期難變，如此情況下退市，無疑是雪上加霜，再加上美國通脹一直以來似有若無，直到最近才略有溫和增長跡象，而美國政府金融海嘯以 來所推行的經濟政策，始終未脫美國歷來處理經濟失衡的一貫做法，僅靠反覆使用量化寬鬆措施，所以QE3看來已無可避免了。 金榮財富管理首席基金經理 史理生(作者為註冊持牌人士) |
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